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Maria C. Dugas*  Committing to Justice: The Case for
 Impact of Race and Culture Assessments
 in Sentencing African Canadian Offenders
Canadian judges have made notable, although too limited, strides to recognize 
the unique conditions of Black Canadians in sentencing processes and decision-
making. The use of Impact of Race and Culture Assessments in sentencing people 
of African descent has gradually gained popularity since they were  rst introduced 
in R v “X.” These reports provide the court with the necessary information about 
the effect of systemic anti-Black racism on people of African descent and how the 
experience of racism has informed the circumstances of the offence, the offender, 
and how it might inform the offender’s experience of the carceral state. This paper 
lays out the legislative authority for considering systemic and background factors 
in sentencing African Canadian offenders; analyzes and classi es the relevant 
case law with a view to establishing a framework for sentencing African Canadian 
offenders and clarifying our thinking about how impact assessments may advance 
sentencing goals; and  ags some of the outstanding issues that require further 
study.
Les juges canadiens ont fait des progrès notables, bien que trop limités, pour 
reconnaître les conditions uniques des Canadiens noirs dans les processus de 
détermination de la peine et de prise de décision. L’utilisation des évaluations de 
l’impact de la race et de la culture dans la détermination de la peine des personnes 
d’origine africaine a progressivement gagné en popularité depuis qu’elles ont 
été introduites dans l’affaire R c. « X .» Ces rapports fournissent au tribunal 
les informations nécessaires sur l’effet du racisme anti-Noir systémique sur les 
personnes d’origine africaine et sur la manière dont l’expérience du racisme a 
in uencé les circonstances de la perpétration de l’infraction, le délinquant, et 
comment elle pourrait in uencer l’expérience de l’état carcéral du délinquant. Dans 
le présent article, nous présentons l’autorité législative permettant de prendre 
en compte des facteurs systémiques et contextuels dans la condamnation des 
délinquants afro-canadiens; nous analysons et classons la jurisprudence pertinente 
en vue d’établir un cadre pour la condamnation des délinquants afro-canadiens et 
de clari er notre ré exion sur la manière dont les évaluations d’impact peuvent 
faire progresser les objectifs de condamnation; en n, nous signalons certaines 
des questions en suspens qui nécessiteraient une étude plus approfondie.
* Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University. Thank you to Michelle 
Williams and Kim Brooks for their comments and support throughout this project.
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Introduction
Canadian judges have made notable, although too limited, strides to 
recognize the unique conditions of Black Canadians in sentencing 
processes and decision-making.1 This emerging approach to sentencing 
has received some attention from the judiciary and media, but it has not 
been canvassed in the academic literature.2 This paper, therefore, makes 
two contributions:  rst, it sets out the legal framework that authorizes 
judges to do this work; and second, it evaluates how the applied context 
should be adjusted to achieve more appropriate sentencing results. 
The ground-breaking decision of R v “X”3 introduced the use of Impact 
of Race and Culture Assessments (IRCAs) into the sentencing process for 
people of African descent.4 IRCAs operate from the assumption that a 
person’s race and culture are important factors in crafting a  t sentence. 
1. As of 9 March 2020, the reported cases on point are: R v Jackson, 2018 ONSC 2527 [Jackson]; 
R v Morris, 2018 ONSC 5186 [Morris] (Crown appeal to the ONCA set to be heard 26 September 
2019); R v TJT, 2018 ONSC 5280 [TJT]; R v Williams, 2018 ONSC 5409 [Williams]; R v Peazer, 2003 
CarswellONT 8084, [2003] OJ No 6283 [Peazer]; R v Reid, 2016 ONSC 8210 [Reid]; R v Nimaga, 2018 
ONCJ 795 [Nimaga]; R v Shallow, 2019 ONSC 403 [Shallow]; R v Elvira, 2018 ONSC 7008 [Elvira]; 
R v Biya, 2018 ONSC 6887 [Biya]; R v Kabanga-Muanza, 2019 ONSC 1161 [Kabanga-Muanza]; R 
v Brissett and Francis, 2018 ONSC 4957 [Brissett]; R v McIntosh, 2019 ONCJ 786 [McIntosh]; R 
v Gaynor, 2019 ONCJ 580 [Gaynor]; R v Clarke, 2019 ONSC 5868 [Clarke]; R v Husbands, 2019 
ONSC 6824 [Husbands]; R v Bryce, 2016 ONSC 7897 at para 32 [Bryce]; R v Duncan, [2012] OJ No 
2966 (SCJ) [Duncan]; R v Borde, [2003] OJ No 354, 63 OR (3d) 417 (ONCA) [Borde]; R v Hamilton, 
[2004] OJ No 3252, 72 OR (3d) 1 (ONCA) [Hamilton]; R v Gabriel, 2017 NSSC 90 [Gabriel] (appeal 
denied on other grounds 2018 NSCA 60); R v “X,” 2014 NSPC 95 [R v X]; R v Perry, 2018 NSSC 
16 [Perry]; R v Gerald Desmond, 2018 NSSC 338 [Desmond]; R v Middleton (25 August 2016) 
Yarmouth (NS SC) [unreported decision] [Middleton]; R v Downey, 2017 NSSC 302 [Downey]; R 
v Boutilier, 2017 NSSC 308 [Boutilier] (appeal allowed on other grounds, 2018 NSCA 65); R v 
Riley, 2019 NSSC 92 [Riley]; R v C(JL), 2017 NSPC 14 [C(JL)]; R v NW, 2018 NSPC 14 [NW]; R v 
Faulkner, 2019 NSPC 36 [Faulkner]; R v Cromwell, 2020 NSSC 14 [Cromwell]; R v AL, 2018 NSPC 
61 [AL]; R v Robinson, 2020 NSPC 1 [Robinson]; R v Ferguson, 2018 BCSC 1523 [Ferguson]; R v 
Anderson, 2020 NSPC 10 [Anderson]. The appellant in R v Rage, 2018 ONCA 211 argued that the trial 
judge failed to consider the overrepresentation of African Canadians in sentencing him. The ONCA 
dismissed the appeal, stating that the trial judge adequately took the appellant’s circumstances into 
account. The case contains no other analysis or discussion of race-based arguments. As such, it will 
not be discussed in further detail. Not all of the cases mentioned in this note will be discussed in detail 
in this paper. 
2. See e.g. Carly Stagg, “Nova Scotia judge explains why cultural assessments matter in 
sentencing,” CBC News (25 May 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca> [https://perma.cc/A5HV-L23G]; 
Adina Bresge, “African-Nova Scotian killer wants race, ‘historical roots’ considered,” CTV News 
(24 May 2016), online: <www.ctvnews.ca> [https://perma.cc/7KK9-QSXT]; Andray Domise, “We 
must address anti-black racism not just in the courts—but as a society,” The Globe and Mail (30 April 
2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com> [https://perma.cc/VJ3F-774T]; Dakshana Bascaramuty, 
“Crime, punishment and prejudice: Courts weighing whether race has a role in sentencing black 
offenders,” The Globe and Mail (28 August 2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com> [https://
perma.cc/8WMJ-58AP].
3. Supra note 1. 
4. The case law sometimes refers to these assessments as IRCAs or Cultural Impact Assessments. 
For ease of reference, I will refer to them as IRCAs throughout. 
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They provide the court with necessary information about the effect of 
systemic anti-Black racism on people of African descent. They connect 
this information to the individual’s lived experience, articulating how the 
experience of racism has informed the circumstance of the offender, the 
offence, and how it might inform the offender’s experience of the carceral 
state.
IRCAs are necessary in the light of the historical and ongoing systemic 
anti-Black racism present in Canada, and its effect on Black Canadians’ 
lived experiences. The prevalence of anti-Black racism is directly connected 
to the history of slavery and subjugation of people of African descent in 
Canada.5 One way in which anti-Black racism continues to manifest in 
this country is through the overincarceration of Black Canadians.6 The 
incarceration rate of Black Canadians is three times our representation rate 
in society.7 This is not simply because Black people commit more crimes.8
5. See e.g. United Nations Specialized Conferences, World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance: Declaration (United Nations: 2001), online 
(pdf): <www.un.org> [https://perma.cc/D3B2-PYAN], endorsed by gen res 56/266 at art 13 [Durban 
Declaration]; Commission on Human rights, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, 
UNECOSOC, 2004, Un Doc E/CN 4/2004/18 Add 2, at paras 68-70 [Diène Report]; Harvey Amani 
Whit eld, North To Bondage: Loyalist Slavery in the Maritimes, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) 
at 6, 111-112 [Whit eld, North to Bondage]; Colleen Sheppard, “Challenging Systemic Racism in 
Canada” in Elaine Kennedy-Dubourdieu, ed, Race and Inequality: World Perspectives on Af rmative 
Action (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006) at 43; B Singh Bolaria & Peter S Li, Racial 
Oppression in Canada 2nd ed (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988) at 188.
6. See e.g. African Canadian Legal Clinic, Errors and Omissions: Anti-Black Racism in Canada 
—Report of the ACLC to CERD (80th Session) (Toronto: African Canadian Legal Clinic, 2012) at 6 
[African Canadian Legal Clinic, Errors and Omissions]; African Canadian Legal Clinic, Civil and 
Political Wrong: The Growing Gap Between International Civil and Political Rights and African 
Canadian Life: A Report on the Canadian Government’s Compliance with the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, report by Anthony N Morgan & Darcel Bullen (Toronto: African 
Canadian Legal Clinic, 2015) at 26, 35 [African Canadian Legal Clinic, Civil and Political Wrong]; 
Robyn Maynard, Policing Black Lives: State Violence in Canada from Slavery to the Present (Black 
Point, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 16 September 2017) at 87-88; David M Tanovich, “The 
Further Erasure of Race in Charter Cases” (2006) 38:84 CR-ART 38 at 47. The problems with 
overincarceration should be self-evident. As such I will not discuss them in depth in this paper. Though 
I will note that the negative impacts include the destruction of black families. See e.g. Dorothy E 
Roberts, “Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement” (2001) 
34:4 UCDavis L Rev 1005. 
7. See e.g. Canada, Of ce of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2014–2015, by Howard 
Sapers (Ottawa: 2015), online: <https://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20142015-eng.aspx> 
[https://perma.cc/H5QK-WYJP] at 3 [OCI, Annual Report 2014–2015]. 
8. See e.g. Akwasi Owusu-Bempah & Scot Wortley, “Race, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Canada” 
in Sandra Bucerius & Michael Tonry, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 297: “it must be stressed that any overrepresentation 
of blacks and Aboriginals in street-level crime and violence can be explained by their historical 
oppression and current social and economic disadvantage.” See also, David M Tanovich, “Using the 
Charter to Stop Racial Pro ling: The Development of an Equality-based Conception of Arbitrary 
Detention” (2002) 40:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 145 at 160-161. 
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It is because of pervasive, systemic anti-Black racism that permeates 
our institutions and social structures.9 The association of black skin with 
criminality has deep roots. It can be traced back to “runaway slave ads,” 
which portrayed self-liberated people of African descent as thieves and 
criminals.10 Slaveholders would place ads in the newspaper when enslaved 
people escaped and would use the court system to af rm their property 
interests in the enslaved person.11
The United Nations’ Working Group of Experts on People of African 
Descent recognized the overincarceration of African Canadian people 
following their visit to Canada in 2016.12 The Working Group noted that 
they were “deeply concerned about the human rights situation of African 
Canadians” and “particularly concerned about the overrepresentation of 
African Canadians in the criminal justice system.”13 Despite representing 
only 3.5% of the population Black Canadians represented 8.6% of the total 
incarcerated population in 2016–2017,14 and 8% of the total incarcerated 
population in 2018–2019.15 In 2017–2018, Black offenders represented 
12% of the incarcerated “young adult” population (ages 18-21).16 
9. Owusu-Bempah & Wortley, supra note 8. See also, supra note 5; Borde, supra note 1 at paras 
29-30; R v X, supra note 1 at para 198; Gabriel, supra note 1 at para 50; Reid, supra note 1 at para 
25; Anderson, supra note 1 at paras 91-94; The Honourable Roy McMurtry & Dr. Alvin Curling, 
The Review of the Roots of Youth Violence (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2008), vol 1 at 43. 
This includes the school to prison pipeline. See e.g. Carl James, Towards Race Equity in Education: 
The Schooling of Black Students in the Greater Toronto Area (April 2017), online (pdf): <https://edu.
yorku.ca/ les/2017/04/Towards-Race-Equity-in-Education-April-2017.pdf> [https://perma.cc/3C68-
EAPE] [Carl James, Towards Race Equity in Education]; Andrea Gordon, “Black students hindered 
by academic streaming, suspensions: Report,” The Star (24 April 2017) online: <www.thestar.com> 
[https://perma.cc/6KQW-2A6T].
10. Maynard supra note 6 at 85; See also, Diène Report, supra note 5 at paras 43, 55; Michelle Y 
Williams, “African Nova Scotian Restorative Justice: A Change Has Gotta Come” (2013) 36:2 Dal 
LJ 419 at 430; Graham Reynolds & Wanda Robson, Viola Desmond’s Canada: A History of Blacks 
and Racial Segregation in the Promised Land (Black Point: Fernwood Publishing: 2016) at 49-63; 
David M Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law 2006) at 56 
[Tanovich, The Colour of Justice].
11. See e.g. DeLancey v Woodin, an 1880 case where a plaintiff brought an action in trover when an 
enslaved person, Jack, ran away and began working for wages in the Royal Nova Scotia Regiment. 
The court decided in favour of the plaintiff, af rming his property right in the enslaved person. 
12. United Nations’ Working Group, “Statement to the Media by the United Nations’ Working 
Group of People of African Descent, on the Conclusion of its Of cial Visit to Canada, 17–21 October 
2016” (21 October 2016), online: <www.ochr.org> [https://perma.cc/D7XX-Y6TV].
13. Ibid. 
14. Canada, Of ce of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2016–2017, by Ivan Zinger 
(Ottawa: 2017), online (pdf): <https://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/pdf/annrpt/annrpt20162017-eng.
pdf> [https://perma.cc/K6TM-QAMG] at 55–56 [OCI, Annual Report 2016–2017].
15. Canada, Of ce of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2018–2019, by Ivan Zinger 
(Ottawa: 2019), online: <https://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20182019-eng.aspx> 
[https://perma.cc/2EU4-782D] [OCI, Annual Report 2018–2019]. 
16. Canada, Of ce of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2017–2018, by Ivan Zinger 
(Ottawa: 2018), online: <https://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20172018-eng.aspx> 
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The Canadian government is well aware of the overincarceration of 
people of African descent. The Of ce of the Correctional Investigator 
(OCI) has been keeping records and reporting on the growing African 
Canadian inmate population for over a decade.17 In its 2011–2012 
report, the OCI identi ed Black inmates as one of the “fastest growing 
sub-groups in [federal] corrections.”18 The population increased by 75% 
from 2002–2012, 90% from 2003–2013, and 69% from 2005–2015.19
Importantly, these alarming increases have occurred despite the problem 
being consistently raised.20 As the OCI reported in 2017, despite the data 
collected on the issue, 4 years after the 2011–2012 report, “very little 
appears to have changed for Black people in federal custody.”21 
The judiciary has also commented on the overincarceration of Black 
Canadians. For example, in R v Golden, the Supreme Court of Canada 
noted that African Canadians, like Aboriginal people, are overrepresented 
in the criminal justice system.22 Judge Derrick (as she then was) made 
a similar observation in R v X.23 In R v Reid, Justice Morgan noted that 
many of the sociological causes for this overrepresentation are linked to 
anti-Black racism.24 Similarly, in NW, Judge Buckle noted that there is 
growing consensus in the case law that African Canadian offenders are 
overrepresented in prison, and that unique systemic and background factors 
may play a role in their offences.25 In Elvira, Justice Schreck observed: 
One does not have to spend much time working in the criminal justice 
system to realize that African–Canadians are overrepresented among 
those accused of crimes. I do not need evidence to draw this conclusion 
any more than I need evidence to conclude that gun crimes are prevalent 
in the City of Toronto.26
[https://perma.cc/LN7B-7P8P].
17. See Jackson, supra note 1 at para 43.
18. United Nations’ Working Group, supra note 12. 
19. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 43, referring to: Canada, Of ce of the Correctional Investigator, 
Annual Report 2012–2013, by Howard Sapers (Ottawa: 2013), online: <https://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/
cnt/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20122013-eng.aspx> [https://perma.cc/W9H3-GAMM] at 3; OCI, Annual 
Report 2014–2015, supra note 7 at 2, 27, 30; Canada, Of ce of the Correctional Investigator, Annual 
Report 2015–2016, by Howard Sapers (Ottawa: 2016), online: <https://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/
annrpt/annrpt20152016-eng.aspx> [https://perma.cc/5JZ5-FC37] at 8, 61–66; OCI, Annual Report 
2016–2017, supra note 14 at 55.
20. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 43. 
21. OCI, Annual Report 2016–2017, supra note 14. 
22. R v Golden, 2001 SCC 83 at para 83. See also Borde, supra note 1 at paras 17-19; Perry, supra 
note 1 at para 76.
23. R v X, supra note 1 at para 197. 
24. Reid, supra note 1 at para 25, referring to R v Nur, 2011 ONSC 4874, at para 79 (appeal allowed 
on other grounds, [2015] 1 SCR 773). See also, Jackson, supra note 1 at para 31.
25. NW, supra note 1 at para 31, referring to: Perry, Gabriel, and Borde, all supra note 1. 
26. Elvira, supra note 1 at 22. 
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Both the government and the judiciary are also aware of the fact 
that the needs of Black offenders are not being met in prison, and that 
Black offenders are typically treated worse than non-Black offenders 
while incarcerated.27 The OCI released a report detailing the Black inmate 
experience in federal corrections in 2014.28 The report explained that 
Black offenders are more likely to be placed in maximum security than the 
general population, despite being rated as lower risk to re-offend.29 Black 
offenders are overrepresented in involuntary/disciplinary segregation30; 
are less likely to be granted federal day or full parole31; are more likely 
to be targeted for discretionary institutional charges, which can add more 
time to their sentence32; and are overrepresented in use of force incidents, 
among other issues.33 The report also explained that the cultural needs 
of Black offenders are not being met while they are incarcerated. This 
includes a lack of cultural programming, a lack of cultural products for 
hygiene, and a lack of relevant community support.34 As a result of these 
factors, African Canadian offenders in effect serve a harsher sentence than 
the general population.35 It is not surprising that in 2019, the OCI stated 
that Black inmates accounted for 37% of all discrimination complaints 
to the OCI between 2008–2018, despite representing only 8% of the 
incarcerated population.36
Because the criminal law in this country has evolved against a backdrop 
of Whiteness as the norm, in the absence of people of African descent, it 
is unsurprising that the ways in which sentences are determined does not 
include the perspectives and circumstances of African Canadian people. 
Therefore, the historical and social context of African Canadians must be 
explicitly included in criminal proceedings, particularly sentencing. IRCAs 
ensure that this information is, at the very least, available to sentencing 
judges. This paper argues that not only have the courts been correct to 
27. See e.g. Jackson, supra note 1 at paras 53-54; Anderson, supra note 1 at paras 75, 78, 104; 
Of ce of the Correctional Investigator, A Case Study of Diversity in Corrections: The Black Inmate 
Experience in Federal Penitentiaries Final Report (February 2014), online: <https://www.oci-bec.
gc.ca/cnt/rpt/oth-aut/oth-aut20131126-eng.aspx#toc4b> [https://perma.cc/QJ58-96TC] [OCI, A Case 
Study of Diversity in Corrections]. 
28. OCI, A Case Study of Diversity in Corrections, supra note 27. This study was updated in the OCI 
Annual Report 2016–2017, supra note 14, which indicated that very little had changed. 
29. OCI, A Case Study of Diversity in Corrections, supra note 27 at para 55. 
30. Ibid at para 59.
31. Ibid at para 62.
32. Ibid at paras 56-58. 
33. Ibid at para 60. 
34. Ibid at paras 23-36. 
35. See e.g. Jackson, supra note 1 at paras 31, 49-54. 
36. OCI, Annual Report 2018–2019, supra note 15.
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accept arguments relating to anti-Black racism and overincarceration as 
an integral part of the sentencing process for Black offenders, but also that 
IRCAs should be mandatory (unless waived by the offender) to ensure 
that the unique circumstances of African Canadian offenders are before 
the court to enable a more informed, anti-racist, and, therefore, more just 
sentencing process. 
Part I of this paper sets out the legislative context in the sentencing 
provisions of the Criminal Code.37 It argues that various sections of the 
Code authorize judges to consider systemic and background factors in 
sentencing all offenders. This approach is consistent with the wording 
of the sentencing provisions, the government’s rationale in drafting the 
provisions, and judicial interpretation of s 718, in particular. This part also 
brie y addresses the youth context contained in the Youth Criminal Justice 
Act,38 as some of the cases were decided based on that authority.39
Part II provides a doctrinal analysis of the IRCA case law, with a view 
to establishing a framework for sentencing African Canadian offenders. It 
begins by identifying and explaining the framework that Justice Nakatsaru 
established in Jackson40 and Morris.41 From there it builds on Jackson 
and Morris by reviewing the cases that adopt a similar approach. Finally, 
it canvasses the lessons that can be learned from the cases that reject the 
Jackson/Morris approach. 
Part III addresses some of the outstanding issues raised by the case 
law. It argues that judges and lawyers should stop defaulting to “this is not 
Gladue”-type arguments and reasoning; that IRCAs should be mandatory 
unless waived by offenders; that sentencing is only one of many tools 
needed to address the overrepresentation of Black offenders in prisons; 
and that judges should do more than simply state that they have considered 
the systemic factors in their reasons. This part then addresses who should 
write IRCAs and what type of information should be included in them. It 
also addresses the role of defence counsel and the need for training in race-
based arguments. Part III is followed by a brief conclusion. 
37. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-64 [Code or Criminal Code].
38. Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2001, c 1 [YCJA].
39. See e.g. R v X, supra note 1; TJT, supra note 1; C(JL), supra note 1. 
40. Supra note 1. 
41. Supra note 1. Morris is currently on appeal to the ONCA, date to be determined. 
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I. The legislative context
Sentencing is governed by Part XXIII of the Criminal Code.42 It provides a 
framework for judges to use in determining a  t sentence for each offender. 
Section 718 delineates the purpose of sentencing: 
718. [Purpose] The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, 
along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and 
the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just 
sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; 
and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment 
of the harm done to victims and to the community.43
Paragraphs (a)–(d) address denunciation, deterrence, separation, and 
rehabilitation, while paragraphs (d)–(f) are restorative in nature, aimed at 
rehabilitating the offender and repairing the harm done to society.44 Section 
718.2 lists additional principles that must be considered by a sentencing 
judge:
718.2 [Other sentencing principles] A court that imposes a sentence shall 
also take into consideration the following principles:
(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or 
the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
(i) evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice 
or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, 
colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual 
orientation or any other similar factor,
(ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused 
the offender’s spouse or child,
(iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a 
position of trust or authority in relation to the victim, or
(iv) evidence that the offence was committed for the bene t of, at 
the direction of or in association with a criminal organization 
shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances;
(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar 
offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;
42. Criminal Code, supra note 37 at Part XXIII. 
43. Ibid at s 718. 
44. R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 23 CR (5th) 197 at paras 33, 43 [Gladue]; Interpretation Act, 
RSC 1985, c I-21 at s 12.
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(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence 
should not be unduly long or harsh;
(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive 
sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and
(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable 
in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with 
particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.45
These provisions are necessarily remedial in nature.46 They aim to remedy 
the overuse of incarceration in the criminal justice system.47 To attain 
their remedial objective, they must be given “a fair, large and liberal 
construction and interpretation.”48 
The weight given to the objectives listed in ss 718 and 718.2 are 
limited by the fundamental principle of proportionality in s 718.1.49 This 
principle requires a sentence be “proportionate to the gravity of the offence 
and the degree of responsibility of the offender,”50 and is constitutionally 
protected by ss 7 and 12 of the Charter.51 Proportionality is meant to serve 
a restraining function to help to ensure justice for the offender.52 
Many sections in Part XXIII authorize judges to order and consider 
IRCAs. The discussion of cultural-based sentencing is largely focused 
on s 718.2(e), which will be addressed shortly, however other provisions 
are also relevant. For example, IRCAs can be grounded in s 718(d) as an 
essential element of rehabilitation; in s 718.1 with respect to the degree of 
responsibility of the offender; in s 718.2(a) as a mitigating factor53; and in s 
718.2(d) as relevant circumstances. They can also be grounded in s 723(2), 
which requires the court to “hear any relevant evidence presented by the 
prosecutor or the offender.”54 Judges are also able to order IRCAs pursuant 
45. Criminal Code, supra note 37 at s 718.2.
46. Gladue, supra note 44 at paras 33, 57.
47. Ibid at paras 46, 57, quoting Minister of Justice Allan Rock introducing Bill C-41. The Criminal 
Code, supra note 37 has been amended to address this issue with respect to bail. See Bill C-75, An Act 
to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts and to make consequential 
amendments to other Acts, 1st sess, 42nd Parl, 2019, s 493.2(b) (Royal Ascent 21 June 2019). 
48. Gladue, supra note 44 at para 32. 
49. R v Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 at para 114, Rothstein (dissenting in part) [Ipeelee].
50. Criminal Code, supra note 37 at s 718.1. 
51. Ipeelee, supra note 49 at para 36. 
52. Ibid at para 37, quoting Justice Wilson in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, 1985 CanLII 81 (SCC), 
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 533. At para 68, the court notes, a just sentence is one that does not operate in 
a discriminatory manner.
53. Case law suggests that s 718.2(e) can also be mitigating. This is addressed in detail in Part II(3). 
54. Criminal Code, supra note 37 at s 723(2). 
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to s 723(3) of the Criminal Code.55 Section 724 authorizes judges to accept 
the information contained in the IRCA as proved at sentencing.56
Section 718.2(e), also referred to as the principle of restraint, is 
particularly important for IRCAs, as it requires judges to consider “all 
available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the 
circumstances” for all offenders.57 The three key aspects of this provision 
are: the circumstances of the offender, the reference to imprisonment, and 
the application to all offenders. 
First, IRCAs provide judges with information relevant to understanding 
the circumstances of the offender. For example, as Justice Derrick stated 
in R v X, the expert evidence (contained in the IRCA and viva voce 
evidence) provided “a more textured, multi-dimensional framework 
for understanding ‘X,’ his background and his behaviours.”58 Similarly, 
Justice Campbell underscored the importance of this information for 
African Canadians, a group he identi es in Gabriel as being subjected to 
“notorious centuries long systemic discrimination”: 
[51] …It is important to know about the systemic and background factors 
that bring any person before the court for sentencing. That is particularly 
so when they relate to members of a group that is disproportionately 
represented in the prison population, disproportionately economically 
disadvantaged, disproportionately disadvantaged in education, and 
disproportionately disadvantaged in health outcomes.
…
[57] Sentencing judges struggle to understand the context of the crime 
and person being sentenced. To do that judges rely on our own common 
sense and understanding of human nature. Sometimes that isn’t enough. 
Our common sense and our understanding of human nature are products 
of our own background and experiences. An individual judge’s common 
sense and understanding of human nature may offer little insight into 
the actions of a young African Nova Scotian male. The [IRCA] serves 
as a reminder of the fallibility of some assumptions based on an entirely 
different life experience.59 
Second, IRCAs are directly connected to the government’s objectives 
when they amended part XXIII of the Code in 1996. The amendments, and 
55. Ibid at s 723(3). This step is important as these reports range in estimate from $3,000–$9,000. As 
a result of the systemic barriers to education and employment, etc., many of the individuals who could 
bene t from these reports are unable to afford them.
56. Ibid at s 724. 
57. Ibid at s 718.2(e). 
58. R v X, supra note 1 at para 198.
59. Gabriel, supra note 1 at paras 51, 57. 
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s 718.2(e) in particular, were enacted as a reaction to overincarceration.60
The government wanted imprisonment to be used as a last resort for 
all offenders.61 IRCAs can help the judiciary achieve this objective by 
connecting the accused person’s experience with anti-Black racism to 
overincarceration.62 They can connect an individual offender to the larger, 
racially-in uenced, social practice of controlling and incarcerating Black 
bodies. IRCAs also help to emphasize the importance of rehabilitation in 
sentencing African Canadian offenders.63 
Finally, s 718.2(e) explicitly refers to “all offenders.” The plain reading 
of this provision includes African Canadians despite no speci c reference 
to us. The court has also held that s 718.2(e) applies to everyone. For 
example, in Gladue, the SCC concluded that the restorative justice goals 
expressed in s 718(d-f) apply “to all offenders, and not only Aboriginal 
offenders.”64 It also concluded that s 718 is evidence of Parliament’s intent 
to “expand the parameters of the sentencing analysis for all offenders.”65
In Hamilton, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that there is “no doubt” that 
s 718.2(e) applies to all offenders.66 
1. Youth context
Because youth are sentenced pursuant to the Youth Criminal Justice Act, 
the judicial authority to order and consider IRCAs in sentencing youth 
is different than in the adult context. The case law in this area appears to 
be con ned to situations where the Crown is seeking an adult sentence.67
This could be because the cases involving an application for an adult 
sentence are more likely to be reported than other youth cases, or because 
counsel has not sought to use IRCAs in less serious cases. Regardless, the 
jurisprudence is applicable to all youth sentences. 
Generally, where any young person is before the court for sentencing, 
s 3(1)(c)(iv) of the YCJA explicitly requires judges to consider the young 
person’s race:
(c) within the limits of fair and proportionate accountability, the 
measures taken against young persons who commit offences 
should… 
(iv) respect gender, ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences and 
60. Gladue, supra note 44 at para 57. 
61. See e.g. ibid at para 46; Peazer, supra note 1 at paras 64-65.
62. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 101. 
63. See e.g. Perry, supra note 1 at para 76; Middleton, supra note 1 at 17, 21; Anderson, supra note 
1 at para 70.
64. Gladue, supra note 44 at para 70.
65. Ibid at para 43. 
66. Hamilton, supra note 1 at para 98.
67. See R v X, supra note 1; TJT, supra note 1; NW, supra note 1. 
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respond to the needs of aboriginal young persons and of young 
persons with special requirements…68
This has been interpreted to authorize the use of IRCAs in sentencing 
young people.69 In situations where the Crown seeks an adult sentence, 
the background of the offender is a relevant factor that the court must 
consider. Section 72 of the YCJA authorizes the court to order an adult 
sentence where (a) the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness 
is rebutted, and (b) a youth sentence would not be suf cient to hold the 
young person accountable.70 Case law has established an offender’s 
background is relevant to the accountability analysis.71 
2. Individualized sentencing
Before moving on to establish the framework for considering systemic 
and background factors, one additional point should be addressed: 
the individual nature of sentencing decisions for all offenders. Courts 
repeatedly state that sentencing is “an inherently individualized process.”72
In R v M(CA), the leading authority on judicial discretion in sentencing, 
the SCC cautioned against a rote, uniform approach to sentencing and 
accepted that sentences may vary for similar offences committed under 
different circumstances: 
…the search for a single appropriate sentence for a similar offender 
and a similar crime will frequently be a fruitless exercise of academic 
abstraction.  As well, sentences for a particular offence should be expected 
to vary to some degree across various communities and regions of this 
country, as the “just and appropriate” mix of accepted sentencing goals 
will depend on the needs and current conditions of and in the particular 
community where the crime occurred.73
From the foregoing, it is evident that both the legislative scheme and 
jurisprudence authorize judges to order and consider IRCAs in sentencing 
African Canadian offenders. The following Part will set out the current 
framework for doing this work, and how it has been applied. 
68. YCJA, supra note 38 at s 3(1)(c)(iv). 
69. R v X, supra note 1 at paras 196-198; TJT, supra note 1 at 82. See also, NW, supra note 1 at 
paras 28-29. Although NW did not involve a formal IRCA, his s 34 psychological assessment included 
a “race and cultural component” that included many of the same factors contained in an IRCA: 
information about his historical and current cultural context and background and systemic factors that 
impacted his life and may have played a role in the offence.
70. YCJA, supra note 38 at s 72. 
71. NW, supra note 1 at paras 27, 30; R v MM, 2013 NSPC 45 at paras 6-11; R v Ellacott, 2017 
ONCA 681 at para 18. 
72. Gladue, supra note 44 at 76, quoting R v M(CA) [1996] 1 SCR 500, 46 CR (4th) 269 at 103 
[M(CA)]. 
73. M(CA), supra note 72 at para 92.
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II. The framework for context-driven sentences for African Canadian 
offenders
This Part outlines, explains, and builds upon the framework for considering 
systemic and background factors in sentencing Black offenders, as 
established in Jackson and Morris, and rooted in s 718.2(e) of the Criminal 
Code.74 Although some judges have recognized their ability to consider 
race and systemic arguments in sentencing African Canadian offenders 
dating back to Borde and Hamilton, there have been growing pains and 
lessons that needed to be learned along the way. One such lesson was 
how to use race-based information as a mitigating factor. For example, 
as Justice Campbell stated in Gabriel, the cultural information “prompts 
a judge to struggle with dif cult questions for which there may not really 
be entirely clear answers.”75 Some judges have stated that they had 
“considered” the systemic arguments in crafting their sentence but did not 
explicitly indicate, nor is it obvious, how those arguments mitigated the 
sentences they determined.76 
Jackson and Morris, two cases decided by Justice Nakatsaru in 2018, 
provide the most recent, comprehensive analysis of why the judiciary 
should consider systemic arguments and how they can mitigate sentence. 
Essentially, the framework involves three parts: (1) taking judicial notice of 
systemic racism77; (2) acquiring information connecting this historical and 
contextual information to the particular circumstances of the offender78; 
and (3) treating all of this information, when taken together, as a mitigating 
factor in the sentencing analysis.79
1. Taking judicial notice of systemic racism
In Jackson, Justice Nakatsaru began by taking judicial notice of the 
history of colonialism, slavery, policies and practices of segregation, 
74. I should note that the use of IRCAs began in Nova Scotia, with R v X, supra note 1. This is 
unsurprising given African Nova Scotian history. A full account is beyond the scope of this paper; 
however, it is worth noting that Nova Scotia has deep roots in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, which 
signi cantly shaped (and continues to shape) the lives of Black Canadians in this province. It is also 
important to note that the African Nova Scotian community is not simply de ned by our history 
of oppression. The contributions that we have made in building Nova Scotia, and our presence, 
perseverance and persistence in  ghting for equality are fundamental aspects of African Nova Scotian 
identity. This paper looks to Jackson, supra note 1 and Morris, supra note 1 to establish the framework 
for considering IRCAs because they are the  rst cases to systematically set out how judges can and 
should go about taking systemic information into account. Importantly, Jackson, the  rst case to use 
IRCAs in Ontario, involved an African Nova Scotian person, and the report was written by Mr. Wright, 
the originator of IRCAs in R v X. 
75. Gabriel, supra note 1 at para 91. 
76. See e.g. Desmond, supra note 1; Nimaga, supra note 1; Riley, supra note 1 at para 30.
77. Jackson, supra note 1 at paras 81-92. 
78. Ibid at paras 93-104. 
79. Ibid at paras 105-115. 
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intergenerational trauma, and the overt and systemic racism experienced 
by African Canadians, and how this has translated into “socio-economic 
ills and higher levels of incarceration.”80 He reasoned that taking judicial 
notice of these facts is consistent with the principle of restraint in s 718.2(e), 
the judicial recognition of discrimination against African Canadians, and 
the doctrine of judicial notice.81
Judges have long recognized their ability to take judicial notice of 
facts that are clearly uncontroversial or beyond reasonable dispute.82 In 
R v Find, the SCC set a strict threshold for judicial notice; courts are 
able to take judicial notice of facts that are: (1) so notorious or generally 
accepted as not to be the subject of debate among reasonable persons; or 
(2) capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to readily 
accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.83 This threshold is relaxed for 
social framework facts.84 Judges are able to take judicial notice of social 
framework facts where they are satis ed that the facts “would be accepted 
by reasonable people who have taken the trouble to inform themselves on 
the topic as not being the subject of reasonable dispute for the particular 
purpose for which it is to be used….”85
Given the plethora of reports conducted on the Black experience in 
Canada and the impact of systemic anti-Black racism,86 and the academic 
80. Ibid at para 82. 
81. Ibid at paras 82, 87. At para 87, Justice Nakatsaru refers to the following cases recognizing 
historical and systemic discrimination against African Canadians: R v Parks, [1993] OJ No 2157, 15 
OR (3d) 324; R v RDS, [1997] 3 SCR 484, 151 DLR (4th) 193; Golden, supra note 22; R v Brown, 
[2003] OJ No 1251, 64 OR (3d) 161; R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32; R v Spence, 2005 SCC 71 [Spence].
82. See e.g. R v Find, 2001 SCC 32 at para 48 [Find]; Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE, 
2004 SCC 66 at para 56; Spence, supra note 81 at para 65; R v Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64; R v Le, 2019 
SCC 34 at paras 83-85 [Le]. 
83. Find, supra note 82 at para 48.
84. Spence, supra note 81 at para 65. 
85. Ibid at para 65 [emphasis in original]. 
86. See e.g. Diène Report, supra note 5 at paras 20, 43, 45; African Canadian Legal Clinic, Civil 
and Political Wrong, supra note 6; African Canadian Legal Clinic, Errors and Omissions, supra note 
6; Canada, Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, Report of the 
Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: 1995) [Canada, 
Commission on Systemic Racism]; Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution: 
Consultative Conference, vol 7 (Halifax: Province of Nova Scotia, 1988) [Consultative Conference]; 
Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, Digest of Findings and Recommendations, 
(Halifax: Province of Nova Scotia, 1989); Dr Wilson Head & Don Clairmont, Royal Commission on 
the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution: Discrimination Against Blacks in Nova Scotia: The Criminal 
Justice System: A Research Study, vol 4 (Halifax: Province of Nova Scotia, 1989); Nova Scotia, Black 
Learners Advisory Committee, BLAC Report on Education: Redressing Inequity—Empowering Black 
Learners (Nova Scotia: Black Learners Advisory Committee, 1994) vol 1–3; Durban Declaration, 
supra note 5 at art 13. 
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literature87 and jurisprudence on point,88 Justice Nakatsaru was correct to 
conclude that he must take judicial notice of the historical and ongoing 
experiences of African Canadians, including our overrepresentation in 
prison. The SCC has explicitly held that “courts have acknowledged that 
racial prejudice against visible minorities is so notorious and indisputable 
that its existence will be admitted without any need of evidence.”89
Recently, in R v Le, the SCC explained, “[e]vidence about race relations 
relevant to the detention analysis, like all evidence of social context, can 
be derived from ‘social fact’ or the taking of judicial notice.”90 
Both the lower threshold for social framework facts, and the higher 
threshold for judicial notice generally, are met. Reasonable, informed 
people who have taken the trouble to inform themselves on the topic of 
the historical and ongoing systemic anti-Black racism in Canada would 
accept that the history of colonialism, slavery, policies and practices of 
segregation, intergenerational trauma, and overt and systemic racism has 
translated into socio-economic ills and higher levels of incarceration. 
These facts are capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort 
to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy, as the government 
has been gathering data and information in this area for decades.91 
These facts should also be so notorious or generally accepted as not 
to be the subject of debate among reasonable people. The only issue may 
87. See e.g. Sheppard, supra note 5; Singh & Li, supra note 5; Reynolds & Robson, supra note 
10 at 46; Tanovich, The Colour of Justice, supra note 10 at 56; Michelle Y Williams, supra note 10; 
Carol A Aylward, Canadian Critical Race Theory: Racism and the Law (Nova Scotia: Fernwood 
Publishing, 1999) at 14-15; Robert S Wright & Jacqueline Barkley, “Race as a signi cant variable 
in the legal system,” The Society Record (31 May 2014) 37; Esmeralda MA Thornhill, “So Seldom 
for Us, So Often Against Us: Blacks and Law in Canada” (2008) 38:3 Journal of Black Studies 321; 
David M Tanovich, “The Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining Racial Injustice 
in the Canadian Criminal justice System” (2008) 40 Supreme Court Law Review 655 [Tanovich, 
“The Charter of Whiteness”]; Dale E Ives, “Inequality, Crime and Sentencing: Borde, Hamilton and 
the Relevance of Social Disadvantage in Canadian Sentencing Law” (2004) 30:1 Queen’s LJ 114; 
Kenneth Donovan, “Slaves and their Owners in Ile Royal, 1713–1760” (Autumn 1995) 25:1 Acadiensis 
[Donovan, “Slaves and their Owners”]; Kenneth Donovan, “Slavery and Freedom in Atlantic Canada’s 
African Diaspora: Introduction,” (2014) 43:1 Acadiensis [Donovan, “Slavery and Freedom”]; Barry 
Cahil, “Slavery and the Judges of Loyalist Nova Scotia” (1994) 43 UNB LJ 73 [Cahil, “Slavery and 
the Judges of Loyalist Nova Scotia”]; Whit eld, North To Bondage, supra note 5; Robin W Winks, 
The Blacks in Canada: a History, 2nd ed (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997); Carl 
James et al, Race & Well-Being: The Lives, Hopes, and Activism of African Canadians (Black Point: 
Fernwood Publishing, 2010); Barrington Walker, ed, The African Canadian Legal Odyssey (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2012) [Walker, African Canadian Legal Odyssey]. There are many, many 
other academic resources on point. 
88. See e.g. supra notes 1, 76. 
89. Spence, supra note 81 at para 5. 
90. Le, supra note 82 at para 71. 
91. See e.g. supra notes 86, 87; all of the yearly reports by the Of ce of the Correctional Investigator, 
e.g. supra notes 14-16, 19. 
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be that Canada and Canadians have a tendency towards collective amnesia 
when it comes to our history with slavery and systemic anti-Black racism.92
However, this comes perhaps from a place of fear, a lack of understanding, 
or wilful blindness, rather than a reasonably held belief that Canada does 
not have a history of subjugating and oppressing Black Canadians and 
disproportionately targeting us for incarceration. 
Taking judicial notice of historical and ongoing systemic anti-Black 
racism also alleviates the need for accused persons to prove these facts in 
court, which can be quite costly given the need to retain experts.93 Due to 
the very racism that they would need to prove, which negatively impacts 
their education and employment prospects, the accused person may not 
have the resources available to produce expert evidence at trial. In this 
vein, not taking judicial notice further entrenches systemic anti-Black 
racism in the criminal justice system.
2. Connecting the historical information to the circumstances of the 
offender
Step two in the Jackson/Morris framework is to connect the historical 
information to the particular circumstances of the offender in an attempt to 
understand how it has contributed to bring the offender before the court.94
This is consistent with the SCC in Ipeelee, and the ONCA in Borde and 
Hamilton, where the courts accepted their ability to consider systemic and 
background factors where they “have played a role in the offence.”95 It is 
also consistent with the individualized nature of sentencing.96 
Offenders do not need to show a “direct” connection between their 
personal circumstances and the historical and systemic factors.97 Proving 
a direct connection would “impose a systemic barrier that would only 
perpetuate inequality for African Canadians.”98 Instead, Justice Nakatsaru 
adopts the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s approach that the link between 
systemic factors, the circumstances of the offender, and the offence “is 
based on inferences drawn from the evidence based on the wisdom and 
experience of the sentencing judge.”99 Offenders therefore must provide 
92. See e.g. Whit eld, North to Bondage, supra note 5 at 4. See also Diène Report, supra note 5 at 
21.
93. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 90. 
94. Ibid at paras 93-104.
95. Borde, supra note 1 at para 32; Hamilton, supra note 1 at paras 133-135; Ipeelee, supra note 49 
at para 77; Gladue, supra note 44 at para 69. 
96. Gladue, supra note 44 at 76, quoting R v M(CA), supra note 72 at 103.
97. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 111. 
98. Ibid at para 112. 
99. Ibid at para 111, referring to R v FL, 2018 ONCA 83 at para 46 [FL], quoting R v Whitehead, 
2016 SKCA 165 at para 63.
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the court with evidence from which it can draw an inference. In Jackson 
this evidence was presented in the form of an IRCA written by Social 
Worker, Robert Wright, MSW, RSW.100 Mr. Wright has authored numerous 
such reports, including the  rst one, in R v X.101 In Morris, the evidence 
was presented in the form of two reports: one addressing anti-Black racism 
in Canada, the other addressing Morris’ social history.102 The reports were 
prepared by Professor Akwasi Owusu-Bempah, Professor Carl James, and 
Ms. Camisha Sibblis, MSW.103 
Despite noting the bene t of such reports,104 Justice Nakatsaru declined 
to hold a presumption in favour of them unless the offender waives their 
right to have systemic evidence before the court. Instead, he held that 
IRCAs are not mandatory.105 His reasoning is threefold:  rst, although 
s 718.2(e) imposes an obligation on sentencing judges in sentencing 
Aboriginal offenders, which creates an obligation to require case-speci c 
information about the Indigenous offender, Gladue-reports themselves 
are not mandatory.106 Second, it is not his role to dictate how information 
should be presented in a given case where an African Canadian is being 
sentenced.107 Finally, he reasons that it is not mandatory to consider 
systemic and background factors for Black offenders such that a failure 
to do so would be an error in principle unless waived by the offender.108
Instead, he concludes that judges must arrive at a  t and proper sentence and 
should take systemic and background information into account “when the 
case calls for it.”109 However, judges may not need additional information 
to be able to do so, and where they do need additional information, it need 
not take the form of an IRCA.110 
100. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 29 (for more on Mr. Wrights’ credentials, see <http://www.
robertswright.ca/> [https://perma.cc/7N2X-M5HD]).
101. Supra note 1. 
102. Morris, supra note 1 at para 13. 
103. Professor James has a Ph.D. in sociology, and is the Jean Augustine Chair in Education, 
Community, and Diaspora at York University and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada (for more 
see ibid at para 15). Professor Owusu-Bempah has a PhD in Criminology and Socio-legal Studies. He 
is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Toronto (for more see ibid 
at para 16). Ms. Sibblis is a PhD candidate at York University. She has a Master’s Degree in Social 
Work (for more see ibid at para 17).
104. See e.g. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 101. 
105. Ibid at paras 94-104. 
106. Ibid at paras 95-96. 
107. Ibid at para 98. 
108. Ibid. The SCC stated in Ipeelee, supra note 49 at para 87 that failing to take the unique 
circumstances of an Aboriginal offender into account at sentencing violates the sentencing principles 
and is a reviewable error on appeal. 
109. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 99. 
110. Ibid at paras 99-100. The issue of whether IRCAs should be mandatory will be addressed in 
further detail in Part III. 
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3. Treating systemic and background information as mitigating factors
This step of the framework requires judges to use the information gathered 
by taking judicial notice of systemic and background factors and the 
case-speci c information in the IRCA (or another source) to arrive at a 
 t sentence.111 The question is, how does this information translate into 
an appropriate sentence? In Jackson, Justice Nakatsaru started from the 
perspective that it can inform the incidence of crime and recidivism.112
This has two components. First, it helps to ensure that judges properly take 
the contextual circumstances of the lived experience of the offender into 
account in sentencing.113 Where this experience is not considered, there 
is a risk that systemic factors may inadvertently lead to discrimination in 
sentencing. The SCC accepted this rationale from Professor Quigley in 
Ipeelee:
Socioeconomic factors such as employment status, level of education, 
family situation, etc., appear on the surface as neutral criteria. They 
are considered as such by the legal system. Yet they can conceal an 
extremely strong bias in the sentencing process. Convicted persons with 
steady employment and stability in their lives, or at least prospects of 
the same, are much less likely to be sent to jail for offences that are 
borderline imprisonment offences. The unemployed, transients, the 
poorly educated are all better candidates for imprisonment. When the 
social, political and economic aspects of our society place Aboriginal 
people disproportionately within the ranks of the latter, our society 
literally sentences more of them to jail. This is systemic discrimination. 
[Citation omitted].114
Justice Nakatsaru applied the same reasoning for African Canadians.115
This led him to conclude that “careful, culturally appropriate, and sensitive 
assessments are a must” in sentencing African Canadian offenders. 
Systemic and background factors in uence how judges apply the 
principles of sentencing. In particular, they may alter the balance between 
the principles of general deterrence and denunciation and other sentencing 
objectives.116 For example, viewed with subtlety and nuance, the principles 
of general denunciation and deterrence may be met by sentences of greater 
restraint.117 
111. Ibid at para 105. 
112. Ibid. 
113. Ibid at para 107. 
114. Ibid at para 107, quoting Ipeelee, supra note 49 at para 67. 
115. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 108. 
116. Morris, supra note 1 at paras 55-57. 
117. Ibid at paras 59-62. 
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Second, the systemic and background information may bear on 
the offender’s moral culpability.118 This relates to the offender’s choice 
to act, and the characterization of the seriousness of the crime, 119 and 
helps to contextualize an offender’s criminal record.120 Justice Nakatsaru 
recognized that an offender’s choice to act may be constrained by their 
circumstances.121 Some offenders may have limited choices available 
to them due to racism and discrimination, which can negatively affect 
employment prospects, education, housing, etc.122 The seriousness of the 
crime must be determined with the offender’s limited choices and personal 
circumstances in mind.123 Systemic and background factors contextualize 
criminal records and help judges to see the offender as more than a series 
of criminal acts. Judges should also bear in mind that systemic factors 
were likely not taken into account during previous sentencings, which 
arguably translates to the offender having received stiffer penalties for 
those offences.124 This approach is consistent with the proportionality 
principle in s 718.1 of the Criminal Code, which requires a sentence to be 
proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility 
of the offender.125 
4. Applying the framework
After setting out the framework, Justice Nakatsaru applied it in Jackson 
and Morris. Jackson was sentenced to 6 years total for possession of a 
prohibited  rearm with ammunition (5 years) and breach of a probation 
order (1 year). After credit for pre-trial custody of 1,203 days, he was 
sentenced to a further 2 years and 257 days in custody.126 The Crown sought 
a total sentence of 8.5–10 years, while the defence sought a 4-year sentence. 
Justice Nakatsaru reasoned that the Crown’s position did not give adequate 
attention to the contextualization of his criminal record, the background 
factors that brought Jackson before the court, the proper understating of 
the seriousness of his offences, ignored his potential for rehabilitation, and 
gave too much weight to deterrence and denunciation.127 While Justice 
Nakatsaru found the defence’s position to be too lenient, he did apply the 
118. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 109. 
119. Morris, supra note 1 at para 56. 
120. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 147. 
121. Morris, supra note 1 at para 56. 
122. Ibid. 
123. Ibid.
124. See e.g. Jackson, supra note 1 at paras 164-166.
125. Criminal Code, supra note 37 at s 718.1. 
126. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 177. 
127. Ibid at para 173. 
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principle of restraint, consider Jackson’s prospects for rehabilitation, and 
treat the systemic and background factors as mitigating.128 
The systemic and background information enabled him to 
contextualize Jackson’s record, understand how he came before the court, 
and ensure that he did not just “write him off [as] a criminal not worth 
the time...”129 Justice Nakatsaru noted that Jackson’s involvement with the 
criminal justice system began when he was young, and that he received 
“pretty tough” sentences from the beginning.130 Jackson struggled with 
his racial identity, which led to struggles  tting in with both Black and 
White communities, and led to him associating with bad in uences.131
He also struggled at school, which is common for Black youth, as they 
are often underserved in the education system due to systemic barriers.132
His mother had mental health issues that were not properly diagnosed or 
treated, which also has systemic roots.133
Morris was convicted of possession of an unauthorized  rearm, 
possession of a prohibited  rearm with ammunition and carrying a 
concealed weapon.134 He was sentenced to 15 months in custody (less 
3 months for Charter violations).135 After credit for pre-trial custody he 
was sentenced to a further 1 day in jail and 18 months’ probation.136 The 
Crown sought 4–4.5 years in custody, while the defence sought 1 year 
before credit for Charter breaches.137
Justice Nakatsaru recognized that the principles of general deterrence 
and denunciation are most important for  rearm offences. He also 
recognized that it would be wrong to only consider those principles as the 
effect of systemic racism on Morris was also relevant.138 Although Morris 
128. See e.g. ibid at paras 101, 123, 147, 149, 164, 169-170. 
129. Ibid at paras 146-149. Justice Nakatsaru also noted at para 164 that despite his lengthy criminal 
record, Jackson’s background was not a factor in those sentencings.
130. Ibid at para 142. 
131. Ibid at paras 127-128. 
132. Ibid at paras 125-126. 
133. Ibid at paras 138-139. 
134. Morris, supra note 1 at para 2. 
135. Ibid at para 97. The Charter breaches are set out at paras 86-96. Brie y, the police hit Morris 
with their police car, violating s 7. They also violated s 9 because they continued to question Morris 
after he asked to speak to a lawyer. Although Justice Nakatsaru took these violations into account in 
sentencing, he declined Morris’ application to stay the charges. Many of the cases set out in this article 
involve Charter violations by the police. These violations did not result in a stay of proceedings but 
were considered in the sentencing analysis. The signi cance of these Charter violations is not fully 
addressed in this paper. However, further research should be done to determine whether systemic 
racism is involved in the impugned police conduct, not only in the cases addressed in this paper, but 
also in all cases where an African Canadian offender alleges a Charter violation by police. 
136. Ibid at paras 97-98. 
137. Ibid at para 6.
138. Ibid at paras 54-56. 
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

           
     








      
    












          
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         
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that systemic factors could be relevant, but that the evidence should 
be presented at trial where it could be tested and the relevance to the 
particular offender could be explored.147 This is precisely what Justice 
Nakatsaru did in Jackson and Morris. Hopefully the ONCA will con rm 
that s 718.2(e) authorizes judges to consider systemic and background 
factors in sentencing African Canadian offenders, and that these factors 
mitigate sentence. Ideally the SCC will also speak to this issue and deem 
the failure to consider systemic and background factors in sentencing 
African Canadians contrary to sentencing principles. 
The antecedent and subsequent case law to Jackson and Morris can be 
divided into two broad categories: cases that are consistent with Jackson/
Morris and cases that reject Jackson/Morris. Through this doctrinal 
analysis, it becomes clear that although judges are taking systemic 
information into account, they do not always communicate how the 
information actually mitigates sentence. 
a. Cases that are consistent with the Jackson/Morris framework148
It should come as no surprise that the decision in R v X is consistent with the 
Jackson/Morris framework. Afterall, X was the  rst case to use an IRCA 
in sentencing and has therefore been relied on in the subsequent case law, 
including Jackson.149 The similarities are obvious: Judge Derrick had the 
bene t of an IRCA, she considered race-based arguments in sentencing, 
and they affected how she sentenced “X.” Justice Derrick did not take 
judicial notice of systemic racism because she did not need to. Instead, 
she quali ed Robert Wright, MSW, RSW, to give opinion evidence on 
the social factors relating to the community where “X” lived.150 He was 
also quali ed to give opinion evidence on the effect of those social factors 
on “X,” and rehabilitative recommendations for him.151 Judge Derrick 
also allowed Mr. Wright to express his opinion about the absence of any 
reference to race in “X”’s psychological and psychiatric assessments 
prepared for sentencing.152 She then used Mr. Wright’s evidence to rebut 
the evidence presented in the psychological and psychiatric assessments 
147. Borde, supra note 1 at para 30. 
148. This section does not address every case that is consistent with Jackson/Morris in detail. For 
example, in Husbands, supra note 1 at paras 83-84, Justice O’Marra agreed with Justice Nakatsaru 
that the impact of systemic racism on Husbands mitigated the seriousness of his criminal record and 
criminal activity “to some degree,” and that his “opportunities and choices” were restricted based on 
his race. 
149. See e.g. Gabriel, supra note 1 at para 50; Desmond, supra note 1 at para 26; NW, supra note 1 at 
para 28. 
150. R v X, supra note 1 at para 163.
151. Ibid. 
152. Ibid. 
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that “X” was a “criminally-entrenched sophisticated youth.”153 For Judge 
Derrick, the race-based evidence provided a textured, multi-dimensional 
framework for understanding “X,” his background, and his behaviours.154 
Given that Judge Derrick’s analysis was focused exclusively on “X”’s 
diminished moral culpability and accountability in the context of a s 72 
application for an adult sentence, the evidence on race and culture was 
not used to mitigate sentence in the way that it was used in Jackson and 
Morris. However, the evidence did inform Judge Derrick’s conclusion that 
the Crown’s application for an adult sentence should fail.155 
In McIntosh, Justice Bourque “whole heartedly” agreed with Justice 
Nakatsaru’s analysis in Jackson.156 Tasked with sentencing McIntosh 
for attempting to possess a restricted  rearm, Justice Bourque took into 
account the “overt and systemic disadvantage” to which Black Canadians 
are subjected.157 He also considered the interaction between speci c and 
general deterrence, where speci c deterrence could be addressed through a 
conditional sentence, while general deterrence could necessitate a custodial 
sentence.158 Ultimately, Justice Bourque found that a custodial sentence 
could “signi cantly impact” McIntosh’s potential recidivism, and in 
McIntosh’s particular circumstances, general denunciation and deterrence 
did not outweigh the appropriateness of a conditional sentence.159 Justice 
Bourque’s analysis is in keeping with Justice Nakatsaru’s conclusion that 
systemic and background factors can impact the balance to be achieved 
between sentencing objectives.160
Judge Williams provided a thorough analysis of how the IRCA 
informed her sentence in Anderson,161 a case involving possession of a 
loaded  rearm. She began by noting that the principles of sentencing often 
do not address the causes of offending behaviour, particularly for people 
whose offending is linked to systemic racism and poverty. She recognized 
that while she must apply the principles of sentencing, she “must also 
gain an understanding and appreciation of the circumstances” that led Mr. 
Anderson to offend.162 This included taking into account the historical and 
social context for Black Canadians, including the overrepresentation of 
153. Ibid at para 198.
154. Ibid at paras 198, 248, 250. 
155. See e.g. ibid at para 240. 
156. McIntosh, supra note 1 at para 21. 
157. Ibid at para 22. 
158. Ibid at paras 23-24. 
159. Ibid at para 27. 
160. Morris, supra note 1 at paras 55-57.
161. Supra note 1. The Crown has  led a notice of appeal. The appeal has yet to be scheduled. 
162. Ibid at para 7. 
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Black Canadians in custody, and the impact that this had on Mr. Anderson’s 
choices. After providing a thorough review of the information presented 
in the IRCA, including issues related to housing, education, employment, 
mental health, intergenerational trauma, and racial pro ling—including 
the fact that “30% of all Black males in Halifax have been arrested for 
a crime at some point in their lives” compared to 6.8% for white men—
Judge Williams addressed how this information impacts sentencing.163 
First, she adopted Mr. Wright’s question: whether she should send 
Anderson to jail, a system that we know will fail him for myriad reasons,164
or sentence him to a community sentence, creating an “opportunity 
for meaningful change.”165 Similarly to Jackson, she then recognized 
that systemic factors are relevant to the principles of sentencing. She 
reasoned that sentencing cannot predominantly be about denunciation 
and deterrence, as “punishment does not change behaviour when the 
actions are rooted in marginalization, discrimination and poverty…”166
Further, deterrence assumes that offenders weigh the pros and cons of their 
behaviour, and operates from the assumption that people can freely chose 
to act, without their choices being limited by systemic and socio-economic 
factors. Because the socio-economic factors “are so powerful and  rmly 
entrenched in systemic racism and marginalization,” she reasoned that 
regardless of what sentence she imposed on Anderson, it would likely not 
provide general deterrence.167 Instead, she concluded that accountability 
and reparation should inform a restorative approach, and that she should 
look to the community to help address the needs of offenders like Mr. 
Anderson.168 She therefore sentenced him to a conditional sentence of 2 
years less a day, and included various conditions to address racialized 
factors that could not be addressed in a federal or provincial jail.169 This 
included “Afrocentric therapy interventions,” community service in the 
African Nova Scotian community, and mentorship through either 902 
Man Up, or IMOVe, two services that provide Afrocentric mentoring and 
therapy to help raise cultural self-awareness.170 
Judge Williams also adequately addressed problematic arguments 
from the Crown. In arguing for a 2- to 3-year federal sentence, the Crown 
163. Ibid at para 64.
164. Ibid at paras 75-79, 104-105. 
165. Ibid at para 95.
166. Ibid at para 88. 
167. Ibid at para 94. 
168. Ibid at para 104. 
169. Ibid at paras 107-112.
170. Ibid at para 107.
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suggested that Anderson was not living a “pro-social” lifestyle because 
he had “71 criminal contacts” with the police, despite no charges being 
laid in relation to those “contacts.”171 As set out in more detail in Part 
III, the Crown also argued that society should not be negatively impacted 
by Anderson’s life circumstances. Judge Williams recognized the need to 
“exercise extreme care” in assessing the Crown’s submissions in the light 
of the history of street checks in Nova Scotia.172 Importantly, streetchecks 
were deemed illegal by former Chief Justice Michael McDonald in 
an independent opinion prepared for the Nova Scotia Human Rights 
Commission in 2019.173
There are at least two noteworthy cases where the court has ordered 
an IRCA at the request of counsel: Middleton, and Boutilier.174 Middleton
is signi cant in two respects: it was the  rst case where the court agreed to 
order an IRCA, which meant that the government paid for the assessment 
instead of the accused (or Legal Aid); and, because Middleton is a 
transcribed copy of the sentencing hearing, it includes all submissions by 
counsel and Middleton’s own comments in addressing the court. Readers 
are able to gain some insight into how the IRCA affected Middleton. He 
described how he let down his guard in discussions with Mr. Wright, how 
the process opened his eyes to the impact that race and racism had on 
his behaviour and interactions with the criminal justice system, and how 
the process gave him hope for his future.175 Middleton went so far as to 
thank Judge MacDonald for ordering the report, stating that he would have 
otherwise not met Mr. Wright, and that he would perhaps have continued 
to “miss the mark”:
I’m not saying I got it all together, but my footing is better. I’m ready to 
move forward in my life so I’ve got to thank you for having [taken] the 
time to see the person and the problems and adjudicate and be fair and 
I couldn’t ask for something more. Now I just trust the process and my 
belief is more today.176 
Middleton plead guilty to multiple breaches of probation and 
undertakings, uttering threats, multiple counts of resisting arrest, 
171. “Criminal contacts” with police likely means street checks, or carding, a practice whereby 
the police collect “personal and/or identifying information” and enter it into the Versadex database 
for future use. See J Michael MacDonald & Jennifer Taylor, “Independent Legal Opinion on Street 
Checks” (October 2019), online (pdf): <https://humanrights.novascotia.ca/news-events/news/2019/
street-checks-legal-opinion> [https://perma.cc/2B8R-3UG7] at 3.
172. Anderson, supra note 1 at para 36. 
173. MacDonald & Taylor, supra note 171 at 9. 
174. Supra note 1. Judge Curran also ordered an IRCA in Faulkner, supra note 1 at para 17. 
175. Middleton, supra note 1 at 16-17. 
176. Ibid at 17, lines 13-15. 
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possession of a controlled substance, assault, and destruction of property. 
Both an IRCA and Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) detailed Middleton’s 
“deeply tragic personal history.”177 He was sentenced by way of joint 
recommendation to a 9-month conditional sentence followed by 1-years’ 
probation.178 As a result, there is not much discussion of how the systemic 
and background factors mitigate Middleton’s offences. However, some 
insight can be gained from the Crown and defence submissions and Judge 
MacDonald’s reasons. The Crown submitted that they were seeking the 
jointly recommended sentence given the background factors set out in both 
the IRCA and PSR.179 Both Crown and defence connected Middleton’s 
distrust of authority (which no doubt played a role in his resisting arrest) to 
childhood abuse and his time spent in the Home for Colored Children and 
the Shelburne School for Boys.180 Defense counsel connected Middleton’s 
engagement with the criminal justice system to his adverse childhood 
experiences.181 Judge MacDonald also commented that the report, among 
other things:
…sets out the context in terms of your becoming involved in criminal 
behaviour and it sets out the context, again, in a way that is—it’s very 
relevant to these proceedings. It’s very important and very relevant.182
The court also ordered an IRCA in Boutilier.183 The decision is 
noteworthy, insofar as it explicitly sets out what the report should address. 
Justice Chipman ordered an IRCA to be prepared as part of Boutilier’s 
PSR to examine the role that Boutilier’s cultural background played in 
his offence.184 The report was to be prepared by an individual(s) with 
“specialized knowledge, education and experience in the completion of 
such reports relating to systemic and background factors affecting the 
African-Nova Scotian Community.”185 Justice Chipman also ordered that 
the report address Boutilier’s African Nova Scotian background, including 
the following systemic factors that could have individual impacts: poverty/
177. Ibid at 12, line 22. Middleton was abused as a child, spent time at both the Home for Colored 
Children and the Shelburne School for boys.
178. Ibid at 19, 21.
179. Ibid at 10, lines 22-25. 
180. Ibid at 9-11. 
181. Ibid at 14-15. 
182. Ibid at 17, lines 21-23. 
183. Supra note 1 at para 16. 
184. Mr. Boutilier stole a van from a dealership. The owners saw him and followed him in their own 
vehicle. Mr. Boutilier crashed into a pole. He continued driving, cutting over a curb and crashing into 
a Volkswagen stopped at a red light. Mr. Blackburn, the Volkswagen’s driver, died as a result of the 
injuries that he sustained in the crash. 
185. Boutilier, supra note 1 at para 17. The report was prepared by Robert Wright.
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low income; poor educational outcomes; community fragmentation; 
historical and contemporary impacts of racialized and intergenerational 
trauma; the overrepresentation of African Nova Scotians in the criminal 
justice system, where there remains little to no culturally relevant 
programming; and the clinical/mental health implications to Black males’ 
psychological and global functioning.186 
The Crown sought to exclude the report on two grounds. The 
Crown argued that Mr. Wright overstepped the scope of his expertise by 
diagnosing Boutilier with a traumatic brain injury and ascribing aspects 
of his behaviour to it.187 Justice Chipman agreed and struck these parts 
of the report from the record.188 The Crown also argued that the report 
should be excluded because the order contained statements about the lack 
of culturally relevant programing in the criminal justice system, which 
the defence should have to prove.189 Justice Chipman ruled that the order 
would stand, but allowed the Crown to cross-examine Mr. Wright.190
Boutilier does not provide much, if any, insight as to how the cultural 
information mitigates the offender’s sentence. Justice Chipman essentially 
split the crown and defence submission (on the Criminal Negligence 
charge) down the middle, sentencing Boutilier to a global sentence of 7.5 
years.191 Although he quotes a series of questions and answers that Mr. 
Wright included in the report, including how Boutilier’s history and identity 
as an African Nova Scotian offender should be addressed at sentencing, 
Justice Chipman did not explain how systemic and background factors 
in uenced Boutilier’s sentence. He did say that the IRCA, together with 
other defence evidence, allowed him to accept that Boutilier expressed 
remorse.192 He also ordered that Boutilier have access to culturally 
appropriate counselling and therapy while in custody.193
Although the court did not have the bene t of an IRCA in Nimaga, 
there was viva voce evidence from Nimaga’s mother addressing the 
186. Ibid at para 16. These factors closely mirror the factors that Ms. Lana McLean identi ed as being 
relevant to understanding the offender in Downey, supra note 1 at para 9, released 2 days later. 
187. Boutilier, supra note 1 at para 16.
188. Ibid at paras 20-23. 
189. Ibid at para 18. See Anderson, supra note 1 at paras 75, 77-78, addressing the lack of services for 
federally and provincially incarcerated African Canadians. 
190. Boutilier, supra note 1 at para 20. 
191. Ibid at para 46. The Crown sought 10 years, while the defence sought 4. Both crown and defence 
sought 1 year consecutive for failing to stop and 6 months concurrent for the theft of a motor vehicle 
(ibid at paras 5, 10).
192. Ibid at paras 29, 39. 
193. Ibid at para 59. The court also ordered culturally appropriate counselling in Downey, supra 
note 1, Middleton, supra note 1, C(JL), supra note 1, and Anderson, supra note 1, a point that will be 
addressed at the end of this Part. 
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systemic racism that Nimaga and her family experienced. She testi ed 
that he was diagnosed with ADHD and learning disabilities, for which 
he received no specialized assistance at school.194 He stopped taking his 
ADHD medication because it made him sleepy, and instead consumed 
marihuana. His family lived in a predominantly white neighbourhood, and 
the other kids would not play with him, which led to him feeling rejected. 
At school other students would tease him about his skin colour. At six, an 
adult educator stuffed a piece of pizza into his mouth because he was not 
eating fast enough, which led to him becoming more violent. When he was 
older, while walking with his girlfriend, the police stopped them and asked 
her why she would associate with a crack smoker. Nimaga believed that 
this incident would not have happened if he was white.195 
Defence counsel relied on Jackson to argue that particular attention 
had to be given to the principle of restraint in sentencing Nimaga for 
possession for the purpose of traf cking and breach of probation. They 
argued that 6 months to 2 years less a day was appropriate, and that no 
further jail time was necessary given Nimaga’s credit for pre-trial custody. 
They argued that it would be appropriate for Nimaga to serve his sentence 
in the community by way of a conditional sentence order and probation.196
Judge Bourgeois agreed with the reasoning in Jackson that she could 
take judicial notice of systemic racism. She linked Nimaga’s background 
and circumstances to the offences for which he was being sentenced, noting 
that there was a “direct” link between the two.197 She concluded that his 
socio-economic background could not be ignored. His addiction, school 
circumstances, unemployment, and family living arrangements were all 
testaments to the systemic anti-Black racism identi ed by the studies 
referred to in Jackson.198 She declined to sentence Nimaga in the range 
of 18 months to 2 years less a day, as requested by the Crown.199 Instead, 
she sentenced him to 7 months, with credit for 6 months and 3 weeks 
pre-trial custody, and 18 months’ probation.200 Like Boutilier, she did not 
explain how Nimaga’s experience with systemic racism was treated as 
a mitigating factor; instead she explained its relevance to his crime, and 
stated that she considered it as a mitigating factor.201
194. Nimaga, supra note 1 at paras 10, 52. 
195. Ibid at para 11. 
196. Ibid at para 6. 
197. Ibid at paras 52, 60.
198. Ibid at paras 60-61. 
199. Ibid at para 3. 
200. Ibid at para 65.
201. Ibid at para 65. 
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b. Cases that expand upon Jackson and Morris
There are a handful of cases that take the Jackson/Morris framework 
further than Justice Nakatsaru. In two of these cases, Elvira and Williams, 
the courts infer the impact that systemic racism has on the offender.202 In 
others, the courts do not go so far as to infer an impact, but they do consider 
race despite not having the bene t of an IRCA or evidence connecting the 
systemic information to the offender.203
In Elvira, Justice Schreck did not have the bene t of an IRCA when 
he sentenced Samuel Elvira, a youthful,  rst-time offender for  rearm and 
drug traf cking related offences. The Crown sought a global sentence of 
6 years’ incarceration, arguing that denunciation and deterrence should be 
the primary considerations.204 Defence counsel sought a global sentence in 
the range of 2–3 years’ imprisonment, given that Elvira was a youthful  rst-
offender and his personal background, including the effects of systemic 
racism.205 Justice Schreck sentenced him to a global sentence of 4 years 
and 3 months’ imprisonment, less time for pre-sentence custody, for a total 
of 2 years less a day going forward.206 He noted the aggravating factors in 
the case included: Elvira’s possession of a  rearm was at the “true crime” 
end of the spectrum, the traf cking charges involved “extremely harmful” 
substances (heroin and cocaine), and Elvira was not an addicted-traf cker, 
but instead chose to exploit those who were.207 The mitigating factors 
included: Elvira’s youth, that he had no criminal record, his supportive 
family, his expression of remorse, and systemic racism and background 
factors.208 
The Crown argued that the evidence of the type adduced in Jackson 
and Morris was not present on the facts of the case, and that since Elvira’s 
brother grew up in similar circumstances and became a successful business 
person, it followed that Elvira’s circumstances growing up played no role 
202. Supra note 1. Peazer, supra note 1 also  ts in this category. There appears to be no IRCA or 
systemic evidence presented to the court, however defence counsel did rely on Gladue, supra note 44, 
and other cases like it to argue that the court should be guided by the principle of restraint in s 718.2. 
In Peazer, supra note 1 at para 59, the court took judicial notice that systemic racism was “likely at 
play in the circumstances of the case.” 
203. See e.g. Reid, supra note 1; Desmond, supra note 1; Cromwell, supra note 1 at para 51. In 
Robinson, supra note 1 at para 25, despite the IRCA not explaining how the systemic information 
related to Robinson’s offending, Judge Sakalauskus nevertheless remained “mindful” that African 
Nova Scotians are overrepresented in custody, in part due to racism and systemic discrimination, and 
that incarceration should always be a last resort. 
204. Elvira, supra note 1 at para 8. 
205. Ibid at para 9. 
206. Ibid at para 36. 
207. Ibid at paras 1-17. 
208. Ibid at paras 18-26. 
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in his criminality.209 Justice Schreck rejected both arguments. With respect 
to the argument about Elvira’s brother, he stated:
With respect, [the Crown’s submission] misunderstands the role of 
adverse personal circumstance in the sentencing calculus as well as the 
concept of causation. … The fact that others in a similar circumstance 
made different choices does not mean that those circumstances had no 
role to play in the choices that were made. Were it otherwise, the fact 
that most Indigenous Canadians do not commit crimes would mean the 
principles in Gladue are irrelevant.210
Justice Schreck also reasoned that Elvira made a choice to become a 
criminal, his brother did not. However, the issue was not whether Elvira 
was morally culpable, which he was; the issue was the degree to which 
Elvira was morally culpable.211
With respect to the  rst crown argument, Justice Schreck acknowledged 
that the case did not include the same type of evidence adduced in Jackson 
and Morris, however he was still prepared to take judicial notice of the 
existence of anti-Black racism and the overrepresentation of African 
Canadians in the criminal justice system.212 He then inferred that Elvira 
was impacted by the effect of anti-Black racism, though the details and 
extent of that impact were not established.213 He addressed the need to 
establish some connection between the circumstances of the offence and 
the systemic information. He concluded that on the record before him, 
the impact of Elvira’s race was “not without some signi cance.”214 Justice 
Schreck reasoned that the area in which Elvira grew up was known to be 
socio-economically depressed and that he had “no doubt” that Elvira did 
not “enjoy many of the same advantages that many non-racialized [people] 
take for granted.”215 
In reaching his conclusion that race was a relevant factor in sentencing 
Elvira, Justice Schreck relied on Williams, a sentencing decision for 
unlawful possession of a loaded  rearm, breach of a probation order, 
and breach of a weapons prohibition.216 At the time of his sentencing, 
Williams was a 20-year-old male of African Canadian and Aboriginal 
heritage. Yet, the only report before the court was a PSR. There was no 
209. Ibid at paras 21, 26. 
210. Ibid at para 26. 
211. Ibid. 
212. Ibid at para 22. 
213. Ibid at para 23. 
214. Ibid at para 25 with reference to Williams, supra note 1, which will be discussed in more detail 
after Elvira.
215. Elvira, supra note 1 at para 23.
216. Supra note 1 at para 1. 
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IRCA ordered. A Gladue Report was ordered; however, it was unable to 
be completed.217 The Crown sought 6 years’ imprisonment (less credit 
for presentence custody of 34.5 months), emphasizing denunciation and 
general deterrence, and the lack of apparent impact of prior court orders 
on Williams.218 The defence sought a sentence of time served, given 
Williams’ youth, his potential for rehabilitation, that he was tasered on 
arrest, the ef ciency of the trial, state misconduct in breaching his Charter 
rights, a case for enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, and the in uence 
of Williams’ cultural background.219
Justice Hill sentenced Williams to a global sentence of 4.5 years, 
reduced to 19.5 months for pre-sentence custody.220 He found Williams’ 
possession of a concealed, loaded handgun in public (including a high 
school), his criminal history for violence, and the fact that Williams was on 
probation at the time of the offences to be aggravating factors.221 Mitigating 
factors included that Williams was 18 when he committed the offences, 
and the trial was conducted ef ciently. Justice Hill also found Williams’ 
background to be a relevant factor.222 He concluded that even with minimal 
evidence connecting the impact of Williams’ experiences as an African 
Canadian person and his Aboriginal heritage to his circumstances, these 
factors carried some signi cance.223 He reasoned as follows:
[45] Having regard to the insidiously stealthy, subtle and general 
incalculable impact of racial discrimination, and the uniform guidance 
of Supreme Court of Canada guidance in the context of offenders of 
Aboriginal ancestry (Gladue/Wells/Ipeelee) rejecting a straight-line 
causation analysis, between cultural disadvantage and commission of an 
offence, before cultural background context is relevant to the sentencing 
function, the court’s dicta in Hamilton is best understood to mean that 
the record before the court ought to raise this issue from the general to 
the speci c in the sense of some evidence, direct or inferential, that racial 
disadvantage is linked to constraint of a particular offender’s choices and 
to his life experience in bringing him before the court.
[46] As a young black-skinned male, the offender is a member of a group 
in the community long the target of racism and discrimination. It is also 
217. Ibid at paras 6-8. Aboriginal Legal Services said they were unable to complete the report because 
both they and Williams were unsure about the speci c nature of his Aboriginal ancestry, and even 
if it could be con rmed, they were unable to address how his Aboriginal heritage affected his life 
circumstances. 
218. Ibid at paras 23-25. 
219. Ibid at para 15. At para 51, the police violated Williams’ rights to silence and to counsel. 
220. Ibid at para 60.
221. Ibid at para 55. 
222. Ibid at para 59. 
223. Ibid at para 47. 
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a notorious fact that black males are disproportionately incarcerated 
compared to their numbers in the community. The court did not have 
the bene t of an IRCA (Impact of Race and Culture Assessment), as 
have some sentencing courts, detailing how a speci c black offender’s 
race and culture might factor into understanding the context of how he 
came to be before the courts—see Regina v. Jackson, 2018 ONSC 2527 
(CanLII); Regina v. Gabriel, 2017 NSSC 90 (CanLII) (conviction appeal 
dismissed 2018 NSCA 60 (CanLII)). 
[47] While the court has, at best, a relatively thin record respecting 
the impact of the offender’s race and Aboriginal heritage upon 
his current circumstances, these factors are nevertheless not 
without some signi cance in considering the appropriate degree of 
punishment.224
Reid, like Williams, considered race without having the bene t of an 
IRCA and without much evidence of the impact of systemic anti-Black 
racism on Reid. The case is particularly interesting because it does not 
appear that counsel raised the race-based arguments.225 Rather, the judge 
was prompted to consider systemic factors by comments made by Reid 
in the PSR. Reid stated that he had made poor choices, was looking to 
better himself and that he “[did] not want to be that 30-year-old black 
man who is a lost cause….”226 Justice Morgan saw this as a call to address 
the overincarceration of young African Canadian men.227 After reviewing 
statistical data and Supreme Court jurisprudence on point, Justice Morgan 
concluded that in sentencing Reid, he needed to consider Reid’s personal 
circumstances and the societal circumstances that contextualized his 
actions.228 He recognized that “racial disparities in imprisonment are 
especially problematic with respect to street level drug dealing,”229 and 
that while the court could not remedy societal issues, it should take them 
into account in sentencing an individual offender.230
Reid plead guilty to 3 counts of street-level cocaine traf cking and 
1 count of possession of the proceeds of crime. The Crown sought a 6- to 
12-month custodial sentence, while the defence argued that a conditional 
sentence order of 2 years less a day was appropriate.231 Reid admitted 
that he had a drug problem and attributed it to his dif cult childhood. He 
224. Ibid at paras 45-47 [emphasis added].
225. The case does not mention any arguments made by counsel about race. 
226. Reid, supra note 1 at para 21. 
227. Ibid at para 21. 
228. Ibid at paras 21-24. 
229. Ibid at para 26.
230. Ibid at paras 26-27. 
231. Ibid at paras 7-8.
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attended a high school known for gang-related violence, where he saw a 
young student get murdered, and his best friend was killed in a shooting.232
As a result, he dropped out of school and found it dif cult to maintain 
a steady job and manage his emotions.233 Given Reid’s background, the 
social context, and his low risk to re-offend, Justice Morgan agreed with 
defence counsel and sentenced him to 2 years less a day to be served in 
the community under strict conditions.234 The sentence was designed to 
meet the objectives of sentencing, including rehabilitation, denunciation 
and deterrence.235
In Desmond, Justice Brothers was asked to take race into account in 
sentencing the offender for criminal negligence in the operation of a motor 
vehicle causing bodily harm.236 The record before her included slightly 
more race-based evidence than in Reid, though the court did not have the 
bene t of an IRCA or PSR. There was evidence from the defence that the 
Department of Community Services took Desmond from his home as an 
infant, that he spent time in the Nova Scotia Home for Coloured Children 
(NSHCC) and was in foster care until age 12. Justice Brothers took judicial 
notice of the physical, psychologic and sexual abuse perpetrated at the 
NSHCC.237 However, there was no evidence as to the effect this had on 
Desmond,238 nor was there any evidence connecting systemic factors in 
general to Desmond’s particular circumstances.239 For this reason, Justice 
Brothers stated that an IRCA would have been helpful.240 Despite the 
lack of evidence, Justice Brothers was still able to conclude that there 
was “certainly some connection” between Desmond’s circumstances and 
his cultural background.241 Although she stated that she “considered” the 
systemic factors and their impact on Desmond, Justice Brothers did not 
explain how that information mitigated sentence.242 The Crown sought 
36 months’ incarceration, while the defence sought 28 months. Justice 
Brothers sentenced Desmond to 28 months. With credit for pre-trial 
custody, he had served his sentence.243
232. Ibid at para 5. 
233. Ibid. 
234. Ibid at paras 28, 31. 
235. Ibid at paras 28-30.
236. Desmond, supra note 1 at para 1. 
237. Ibid at para 13. 
238. Ibid. 
239. Ibid at para 23. 
240. Ibid at para 28. 
241. Ibid at para 23. 
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Finally, in Faulkner, Justice Whalen explains how systemic factors are 
relevant to determining the appropriate range for sentencing. As Jackson 
and Morris establish, systemic factors are relevant to contextualize the 
offender’s criminal record, but Justice Whalen clari es that judges should 
also consider whether there was an IRCA before the court in the cases 
that counsel reference to determine the appropriate sentencing range.244
For example, she notes that it was “glaringly obvious” that in the robbery 
cases that she was referred to, “there was no [IRCA] before the court or 
any information about the intersection of race and the criminal justice 
system.”245 Coupled with the notion that IRCAs are necessary to arrive 
at a  t and proper sentence for an African Canadian person, it is relevant 
to consider whether the range-setting cases dealt with racialized people, 
and whether there was evidence before the court about the intersection 
of race and the criminal justice system. As Justice Whalen puts it, IRCAs 
provide information on the “defendant’s “background” which is part of the 
“formula” when considering the “range” and  nal disposition imposed.”246
c. Cases where the court declined to apply Jackson and Morris due to 
lack of evidence
Some cases adopt the reasoning in Jackson/Morris, but do not apply it 
because there was no IRCA prepared, or no evidence provided to the court 
connecting the background and systemic information to the circumstances 
of the offender.247 For example, in Shallow, defence counsel argued that 
race was a relevant factor in sentencing the African-Canadian offender, 
relying on Jackson and Borde.248 Defence counsel also argued that race 
was relevant to whether Shallow should receive credit for ss 8 and 10(b) 
Charter breaches.249 Justice Spies took judicial notice of the systemic 
factors outlined in Jackson.250 She also agreed with the reasoning in Reid 
that social considerations should be taken into account, particularly the 
fact “that the offender was black and that racial disparity in imprisonment 
is especially problematic with respect to street level drug dealing.”251
However, she concluded that she had no evidence that Shallow’s possession 
for the purpose of traf cking charges were “due to his African Canadian 
244. Faulkner, supra note 1 at para 57. 
245. Ibid.
246. Ibid.
247. See e.g. Shallow, supra note 1 at para 48. See also, Ferguson, supra note 1 at paras 120-129; 
Bryce, supra note 1 at para 32; Duncan, supra note 1 at para 86; Gaynor, supra note 1 at paras 24, 26. 
248. Shallow, supra note 1 at paras 38-40. 
249. Ibid at paras 30, 49. 
250. Ibid at para 48. 
251. Ibid at para 44, referring to Reid, supra note 1 at para 26. 
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background,” poverty, or peer pressure.252 She reasoned that although 
Shallow was diagnosed with a learning disability, he received educational 
support; although his uncle was deported, which was considered a major 
disruptive episode in his emotional development, she could not conclude 
that this was connected to race discrimination; and, his mother was always 
supportive of him.253 
Defence counsel argued that given Shallow’s past anxiety in dealing 
with the police, he should be given credit for the beach of his Charter 
rights.254 Shallow told his social worker that during a previous arrest, the 
police used brute force to restrain him and were verbally abusive.255 He 
also said that he developed a mistrust for police and a fear that he would 
be targeted after being repeatedly and frequently carded by police.256
Defence counsel argued that the police need to carefully explain things 
“to a tee” and try to repair their relationship with the Black community.257
Justice Spies did not agree that this warranted a reduction in sentence. 
She reasoned that although she had evidence of how Shallow felt after 
previous interactions with the police, there was no evidence as to how his 
interactions with the police affected him on this occasion.258
Shallow, and the cases like it,259 could  t in the category of cases that 
are inconsistent with Jackson/Morris given that Justice Nakatsaru sets out 
the steps that judges can take to ensure that the court has the necessary 
information to consider systemic and background factors:
…When the case calls for it, a sentencing judge should take any relevant 
systemic or background factors into consideration. They should also have 
suf cient information to do that. Section 723(3) of the Criminal Code 
permits a judge to order the production of evidence that would assist in 
the determination of the appropriate sentence. Further s 723(4) allows 
the court to compel the appearance of any person who is a compellable 
witness and can assist. Finally, under s 721(4) the court can require a 
pre-sentence report to contain information on any matter after hearing 
arguments from the parties.  Thus, when appropriate, these provisions 
can provide a vehicle whereby the sentencing judge can obtain further 
252. Shallow supra note 1 at para 48. 
253. Ibid. 
254. Ibid at para 50. 
255. Ibid at para 13. The charges against him were later dropped. 
256. Ibid. 
257. Ibid at para 50. 
258. Ibid at paras 50-51. 
259. Shallow, supra note 1, Ferguson, supra note 1, Bryce, supra note 1, Duncan, supra, note 1, and
Gaynor, supra note 1. Clarke, supra note 1 also  ts into this category, though it will be addressed 
in more detail bellow. At paras 54, 57-59, Justice Lemay makes some effort to secure evidence 
connecting systemic racism to the circumstances of the offender, but he does not go so far as to 
exercise his authority under s 723(3). 
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information in order to do justice in the individual case: Borde at para. 
32.260
This approach would not run afoul of Hamilton, which holds that judges 
should not become an advocate or an inquisitor.261 Where it is clear to 
the court that defence counsel is making arguments relating to systemic 
and background factors, it would be appropriate for the court to exercise 
its authority to obtain information about the effect of those factors on 
the particular offender. Arguably, the court has an obligation to acquire 
this information. In Le, the SCC concluded that for the purposes of a s 9 
Charter analysis, judges must take into account the racial background of 
the accused in assessing whether the reasonable person would perceive 
that they are being detained. This imposes a positive duty on judges to 
understand the community that they are judging. By extension, this should 
also apply to sentencing involving a racialized person. 
d. Cases that reject or are inconsistent with the Jackson/Morris 
framework
This section addresses the arguments raised in the case law where 
courts have refused to apply Jackson/Morris, or to consider race-based 
arguments in sentencing. The starting point in this category is Brissett, 
decided 4 months after Jackson.262 The offenders, Brissett and Francis, 
were convicted of living off the avails of prostitution and exercising 
control, direction or in uence over the movements of the victim to aid, 
abet or compel her to engage in prostitution.263 The crown sought a 5-year 
sentence (2.5 years on count one, to be served concurrently to 5 years on 
count 2). The defendants sought 5 months. In the alternative, Mr. Francis 
sought time served (1,083 days). Justice Lemay sentenced Francis to 
3 years, less 1,083 days for remand credit, and sentenced Brissett to 4 
years, given his higher level of involvement in the offences. Relying on 
Jackson, counsel for both parties asked the court to take judicial notice of 
the historical racism and discrimination against African Canadians, and 
the effects of this history on the offenders.264 Justice Lemay took issue with 
the reasoning in Jackson and declined to apply it. 
However, Justice Lemay’s issues with Jackson appear to be based on 
a misguided view that it says courts should take judicial notice of systemic 
260. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 99. 
261. Hamilton, supra note 1 at paras 3, 65, 71. See also Jackson, supra note 1 at para 100. 
262. Supra note 1. 
263. Ibid at para 1. 
264. Ibid at para 54.
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racism and the effects that it has on the accused.265 He reasoned that this 
approach is not consistent with Hamilton, and that Justice Nakatsaru 
could not rely on the recognition of systemic racism in other aspects of the 
criminal justice system to justify his approach because sentencing requires 
a connection between systemic racism and the circumstances of the 
crime.266 However, Jackson does not stand for the principle that judges can 
take judicial notice of systemic factors and their effects on the offender. 
Justice Nakatsaru speci cally addressed the need for some information 
connecting the historical and systemic factors to the circumstances of the 
offender.267 Further, the fact that systemic racism exists at other stages 
of the criminal justice system is relevant to sentencing, insofar as it 
recognizes that the criminal justice system as a whole is implicated in the 
overincarceration of Black Canadians. 
In Brissett, the parties did not provide evidence to the court connecting 
the systemic information to the circumstances of the offenders. Justice 
Lemay noted that the PSR “provided no signi cant indications of any 
issues.”268 He also asked defence counsel to point to evidence in the 
PSR that connected the historical information to their clients; they were 
unable to and could not point to any evidence on the record.269 This 
raises two important issues: the need for defence counsel to understand 
that they must present the court with evidence of the effects of systemic 
and background factors on their clients,270 and the need for the judiciary 
to understand that just because a PSR does not raise race-related issues 
does not mean that they are not present.271 Various factors could correlate 
to a lack of race-based information in a PSR, including: the offender 
not feeling comfortable talking about race-based trauma with the PSR 
writer, and a lack of understanding by the PSR writer that race may be a 
factor.272 Additionally, research has shown that PSRs can perpetuate and 
entrench anti-Black racism in sentencing.273 For these reasons, it is best for 
defence counsel to provide the court with evidence connecting systemic 
265. Perhaps because this was the position argued by defence counsel (ibid). 
266. Ibid at paras 58-72. 
267. See e.g. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 111. 
268. Brissett, supra note 1 at para 71. 
269. Ibid at para 61. 
270. This point will be addressed in further detail bellow, regarding the need to make IRCAs 
mandatory. 
271. See Canada, Commission on Systemic Racism, supra note 86 at 285: the Commission cautioned 
that “judges should not be wholly dependent on probation of cers for information that is so important 
to fairness in sentencing.”
272. See e.g. R v X, supra note 1 at para 189.
273. Kelly Hannah-Moffat, “Actuarial Sentencing: An ‘Unsettled’ Proposition” (2013) 30:2 Justice Q 
270 at 280-282. 
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and background factors to the circumstances of their client, for example, 
through an IRCA. 
Justice Lemay also cautioned against allowing “societal ills” to 
outweigh other factors in sentencing.274 He adopts the reasoning in 
Hamilton that “[i]f [societal] ills are given prominence in assessing 
personal culpability, an individual’s responsibility for his or her own actions 
will be lost.”275 However, considering systemic and background factors 
is not about providing race-based discounts or denying responsibility.276
Rather, it contextualizes the crime, and recognizes that factors outside of 
the offender’s control may affect their actions and moral culpability.277 It 
also helps to hold the criminal justice system accountable for its role in 
the overrepresentation of Black offenders at every stage of the system.278
Robert Wright has been quoted as saying, “the ‘race discount’ that people 
are talking about is not a discount as much as it’s calling attention to the 
fact that we have been systematically overcharged forever… that’s not a 
discount, that’s justice.”279
The circumstances for not considering systemic arguments in Clarke 
are eerily similar to Brissett, though Justice Lemay did make some effort 
to secure evidence connecting systemic racism to the circumstances of 
the offender. When defence counsel  rst argued that Jackson and Morris 
should apply, Justice Lemay directed them to his decision in Brissett 
and Francis.280 Defence counsel conceded that there was no race-based 
evidence before the court, but suggested an adjournment to obtain 
additional evidence. Justice Lemay rejected this proposal for two reasons: 
 rst, “and most importantly,” he concluded that the PSR “did not provide 
[him] with any sense that information showing that the offender was 
personally affected by the issues raised in Jackson might exist.” Second, 
despite numerous appearances before the court on this matter, and Justice 
Lemay “strongly” encouraging Ms. Clarke’s cooperation to prepare 
a report “in order to obtain this very information if it existed,” no such 
evidence was before the court on their fourth appearance.281 Justice Lemay 
therefore declined to apply Jackson and Morris, either by concluding that 
the evidence did not exist, as he seems to be suggesting with his comment 
274. Brissett, supra note 1 at para 69.
275. Ibid at para 68, quoting Hamilton, supra note 1 at para 140. 
276. See e.g. Gabriel, supra note 1 at para 52; Elvira, supra note 1 at para 26.
277. See e.g. Elvira, supra note 1 at para 26; Anderson, supra note 1 at paras 91, 94. 
278. See Bascaramuty, supra note 2. 
279. Ibid.
280. Clarke, supra note 1 at para 54, referring to Brissett, supra note 1 at paras 54-72. Sentencing 
took place over 2 days in June and September. Defence counsel  rst raised the issue in June. 
281. Clarke, supra note 1 at paras 57-59. 
142 The Dalhousie Law Journal
about the PSR, or at the very least because the evidence was not before the 
court.282 Again, this case highlights the need for defence counsel to put the 
necessary evidence before the court. 
Similarly to Brissett and Clarke, Justice Wake eld rejected the Jackson 
analysis in Gaynor.283 He too felt bound by Hamilton, and the rationale that 
sentences should not be lowered based on “nothing more than membership 
in a disadvantaged group.”284 He noted that even if Jackson is accepted in 
the future, he did not have the necessary evidentiary foundation to apply 
it.285 
The following two cases, Downey and Biya, arguably mistreat the 
impact of systemic anti-Black racism to varying degrees. Downey plead 
guilty to punching Kaylin Diggs outside a downtown bar, which caused 
him to fall and fatally hit his head. At a contested sentencing hearing the 
Crown sought 7 years in custody, while the defence sought 2-3 years. 
Justice Rosinski sentenced him to 4 years. A PSR and IRCA were prepared 
for sentencing. Justice Rosinski noted that the IRCA spoke to a history of 
discrimination, a cultural code of resolving social injustice by not leaving, 
backing down, or being “punked out,” and being unconsciously hyper-
vigilant to potential con icts, among other issues.286 The race and cultural 
impacts for Downey included: the impacts of historical and contemporary 
systemic racism, the impact of community dislocation and fragmentation, 
clinical/mental health implications to black male psychological and global 
function, poor education outcomes, and the overrepresentation of African-
Nova Scotians in the criminal justice system where there remains little 
to no culturally relevant programming.287 However, Justice Rosinski 
concluded that there was no “social injustice trigger” that played a role in 
Downey’s offence:
In the circumstances of this case, there was no social injustice trigger; no 
racial or discriminatory [black versus white] trigger evident; no realistic 
need to be hyper-vigilant, given that I have concluded that Mr. Downey 
was in the company of Michael Chisholm who was  ghting Cody Good, 
surrounded by 8 to 10 of their friends, when Mr. Diggs, an African-Nova 
Scotian male of similar age, arrived at the  ght to assess his friend Cody 
Good’s situation. None of the foregoing factors could realistically be 
said to play any role in Mr. Downey’s striking Mr. Diggs.  Moreover, I 
reiterate Justice Campbell’s comments in R. v. Gabriel, 2017 NSSC 90
282. Ibid.
283. Gaynor, supra note 1 at para 23.
284. Ibid.
285. Ibid at paras 23-24. 
286. Downey, supra note 1 at para 8. 
287. Ibid at para 9. 
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(CanLII), at para. 90:
Those questions are why a cultural assessment with respect to an 
African-Nova Scotian offender serves such an important purpose. It 
does not provide a justi cation for a lighter sentence. Like a Gladue 
Report, it might prompt the consideration of restorative justice 
options where those are appropriate. It doesn’t position the offender 
as a helpless victim of historical circumstances.288
Respectfully, this conclusion misses the mark. The idea that the 
impact of systemic racism requires a “social injustice trigger,” or a “black 
versus white” trigger to manifest in the actions of a young, black male 
is misguided. It ignores the reality that systemic racism is pervasive and 
prevalent in all of our institutions. The court should not require a speci c 
black versus white trigger in a given situation to consider race and 
systemic anti-Black racism in sentencing. This would effectively require 
a “direct” connection between racism and the offence, which the SCC and 
other courts have rejected.289 It also seems to suggest that systemic racism 
plays no role in Black-on-Black crime.290 Justice Rosinski’s sentence was 
closer to what the defence sought than the Crown. However, this could 
be because he concluded that there was no evidence that Downey sucker 
punched the victim.291
Biya was convicted of possession of a loaded  rearm, careless storage 
of a  rearm, careless storage of ammunition, possession while unauthorized 
( rearm and ammunition), unauthorized possession of a  rearm knowing 
possession was unauthorized, occupying a motor vehicle knowing there 
was a  rearm, possession for the purpose of traf cking (MDEA), and 
possession of the proceeds of crime.292 Justice Brown sentenced him to 
4 years (less 3 months and 51 days of pre-trial custody). She rejected 
defence arguments to take into account the principles in Morris regarding 
the systemic overrepresentation of Black Canadians in prison.293 She 
found that Biya’s circumstances were not applicable given that he “lived 
in a stable, supportive family, had a good education, indicated that he had 
288. Ibid at para 10. 
289. See e.g. Ipeelee, supra note 49 at para 83; FL, supra note 99 at para 46; Jackson, supra note 1 at 
paras 111-112; Williams, supra note 1 at paras 45-47. 
290. On this point, see e.g. Anderson, supra note 1 at paras 48-49, 59-63 where Judge Williams 
discusses the historical roots and patterns of violence in African Nova Scotian communities, as set out 
in the IRCA. 
291. Downey, supra note 1 at para 4.
292. Biya, supra note 1 at para 1.
293. Ibid at para 36. 
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no concerns about his neighbourhood or the community in which he was 
raised and did not witness violence either in the community or at home.”294
This aspect of Biya is potentially problematic. It is possible to grow up in 
a “stable” home and still experience the effects of systemic discrimination. 
For example, the court in Peazer concluded that it was open to the court to 
 nd that the offender was either directly or indirectly affected by systemic 
anti-Black racism, “despite his own advantaged background,” by virtue of 
his membership in the larger Black community.295 It is also possible to be 
impacted by systemic racism without having conscious knowledge of this 
fact.296 Without the bene t of an IRCA prepared by a quali ed writer who 
could dig into Biya’s life circumstances, and uncover what, if any, effect 
racism had on him, Justice Brown was limited to the information before 
her: Biya’s indication that he had no concerns about his neighbourhood, 
and the evidence that he grew up in a stable home. 
e. Cases where judges refuse to consider systemic arguments
There are also cases where the court has refused to consider the systemic 
arguments made by counsel. In C(JL) Judge Derrick (as she then was) 
refused to order the preparation of s 34 psychological assessment297 “with 
a cultural component” in the context of a s 94 sentence review.298 Because 
Nova Scotia Legal Aid (NSLA) had declined to pay for an IRCA, J.C.’s 
counsel requested that the court order one,299 arguing that it would be 
bene cial to his sentence review. Although Judge Derrick accepted that a 
cultural assessment would be a relevant component of a s 34 assessment 
for an African Nova Scotian young person, in the particular circumstances 
of the case, it would not “enable [her] to make a more informed decision 
under s 94(19)” of the YCJA.300 This is because the only options available 
to her were to con rm the sentence, or release J.C. from custody under 
conditional supervision.301 Judge Derrick concluded that she had to 
294. Ibid. 
295. Peazer, supra note 1 at para 59. 
296. For example, in Gabriel, supra note 1 at para 105, Justice Campbell commented that Gabriel’s 
“perception of his childhood as being relatively stable is perhaps a comment on his diminished 
expectations rather than reality.” Gabriel’s childhood appears to be far different than Biya’s: a 
childhood marked by sexual assault, an absent father, racism, problems at school, time in a youth 
facility, and multiple re-locations, to name a few. However, this passage from Gabriel highlights that 
judges should not necessarily take the offender’s words about their experience of systemic racism at 
face value. 
297. YCJA, supra note 38 at s 34. 
298. Ibid at s 94. 
299. C(JL), supra note 1 at paras 17, 18. Given the high cost associated with preparing IRCAs, NSLA 
is not able to pay for them for every client. 
300. Ibid at para 41, referring to YCJA, supra note 38 at s 94(19). 
301. YCJA, supra note 38 at s 94(19); C(JL), supra note 1 at para 24. 
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con rm his sentence because J.C. was charged with serious adult offences 
and remanded to an adult facility for crimes he allegedly committed 5 
months into his 27-month Custody and Supervision Order302; he had a long 
history of not successfully following release conditions; and, he breached 
his conditions and committed new offences.303 
Defence counsel argued that the s 34 assessment would be bene cial 
even where the only option was to con rm J.C.’s sentence.304 It could have 
enabled J.C. to re-apply for NIRCS (Non-Intensive Rehabilitative Custody 
and Supervision) 305 funding, J.C. could have used it in his bail review on 
the adult charges, and it would have bene tted him in custody and with 
his eventual release and reintegration.306 However, Judge Derrick did not 
accept these arguments. She concluded there was a small window in which 
J.C. could bene t from the assessment while in youth custody, given that 
the custodial portion of his sentence would be complete in 5 months.307
Further, there was no evidence that the cultural assessment would identify 
new services, programs, or greater opportunities for rehabilitation in the 
community, nor was there any evidence that J.C.’s NIRCS denial could be 
revisited. 
In Kabanga-Muanza, Justice Spies also declined to consider systemic 
arguments because they would not affect her decision on sentence. The 
offender was convicted of various  rearm-related offences.308 The Crown 
sought a global sentence of 6.5 years, less pre-sentence credit. Defence 
counsel sought a global sentence ranging from time served to 3 years. 
Counsel made “voluminous submissions” on considering systemic and 
background factors in sentencing Kabanga-Muanza.309 The Crown argued, 
302. C(JL), supra note 1 at para 1. He was charged with participating in a riot, assaulting youth 
workers and property damage. 
303. Ibid at para 33. 
304. Ibid at para 28. 
305. An IRCS sentence is a rare sentence for serious violent offenders. It involves a period of custody 
with mandatory treatment followed by conditional supervision and support in the community. See 
“Explore the YCJA,” online: <https://www.ycja.ca/?q=teachers/youth-sentencing-options/in-depth-3> 
[https://perma.cc/W528-KDQE]. NIRCS funding is sometimes available for cases that qualify for 
special treatment due to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the young person. See 
Nova Scotia Department of Justice, YCJA Pocket Guide, online (pdf): <https://novascotia.ca/just/
YCJAPocketGuide/docs/2013.pdf> [https://perma.cc/9TB3-A74H] at 45. 
306. C(JL), supra note 1 at para 28. 
307. Ibid at para 29. 
308. Kabanga-Muanza, supra note 1 at para 1. He was convicted of careless storage of a  rearm, 
careless storage of ammunition, possession of a prohibited  rearm without a license and registration 
certi cate, possession of a prohibited  rearm knowing that he did not have a license and registration 
certi cate, possession of a loaded restricted  rearm with readily accessible ammunition, possession 
of a  rearm knowing that the serial number had been defaced, and possession of a  rearm while 
prohibited from doing so by reason of a s 109 order. 
309. Ibid at para 60. 
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“any relevance that systemic and background factors have to moral 
blameworthiness should not be extended to the issue of denunciation as it 
relates to serious crimes for non-[I]ndigenous offenders.”310 It is not clear 
from the case what arguments defence counsel made, however it could be 
inferred that they argued that given Kabanga-Muanza’s African heritage, 
systemic racism should be a mitigating factor.311 Justice Spies concluded 
that it was “not necessary” for her to “weigh into” the debate about what 
role race should play in sentencing Kabanga-Muanza, given her decision to 
effectively sentence him to time served.312 He received a 4.5-year sentence 
with credit for 5 years of pre-trial custody.313
While it makes sense that Justice Spies did not need to consider 
mitigating Kabanga-Muanza’s sentence based on race, given that he was 
effectively sentenced to time served, it still would have been appropriate 
for her to do so. She sentenced him to 4.5 years in custody for his offences. 
Had she considered systemic and background factors it is possible that 
she would have arrived at a lesser sentence. While this would not have 
impacted the ultimate outcome of the case, it would have other bene ts. For 
example, it would have helped to build the body of case law addressing the 
use of systemic and background factors in sentencing Black Canadians. It 
could have set precedent for receiving a lesser sentence for these offences. 
It could have signaled to Black Canadians that the judiciary is beginning 
to understand the role that anti-Black racism plays in crime. It would be 
relevant in the future should Kabanga-Muanza be sentenced for additional 
crimes, give that sentences typically increase with each subsequent offence. 
And, it would have (hopefully) prevented the judge from saying that 
she considered Kabanga-Muanza’s upbringing in reaching her decision 
“without considering the colour of his skin.”314 
f. Cases where the IRCA informs how the accused serves their sentence
Before moving on, there is another category of cases worth mentioning: 
those that address how an IRCA can inform how an offender serves 
their sentence. Boutilier, Downey, Middleton, and Anderson  t into this 
310. Ibid at para 63. 
311. Ibid at paras 60-61. Defence counsel referred to Elvira, supra note 1, Jackson, supra note 1, 
Morris, supra note 1, and Reid, supra note 1. 
312. Kabanga-Muanza, supra note 1 at para 63. 
313. Ibid at paras 117-118, 129. Kabanga-Muanza was given additional pre-sentence credit for 
extensive time spent in lockdown. 
314. Ibid at para 106. Although it may have not been intentional, this statement is reminiscent of “I 
do not see colour” arguments, which serve to ignore the realities of black identity. Ian F Haney Lopez, 
White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race, (New York: Ney York University Press, 1996) at 176 
states, “in order to get beyond racism, we must  rst take account of race. There is no other way.” 
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category.315 This aspect of the case law is important in situations where 
the judge concludes that a custodial sentence is still necessary, despite 
mitigating for systemic and background factors. As set out earlier, despite 
being overrepresented in custody, Black offenders are also underserved 
while incarcerated.316 The OCI reported that correctional programs are not 
culturally relevant, cultural products are not available, there is a lack of 
community support, and that Black offenders are more likely to be placed 
in maximum security institutions, among other issues.317 In this context it 
is signi cant that judges are using the information that they learn about 
the offender to order culturally appropriate counselling while the offender 
is incarcerated or serving their sentence in the community. It is otherwise 
unlikely that Black offenders will have access to these resources, as 
identi ed by the OCI.318
There are institutional costs associated with these judicial orders. For 
example, federal penitentiaries will need to hire culturally appropriate 
counsellors to meet this need. This is not to suggest that the judiciary should 
not order culturally appropriate counselling, rather it is to encourage the 
government to meet these needs. Culturally informed sentences can help to 
rehabilitate offenders. For example, Middleton told the court that through 
his conversations with Robert Wright that he was better able to understand 
his behaviours and what led him to be involved with the criminal justice 
system.319 In Anderson, Judge Williams concluded that Anderson needed 
Afrocentric therapy and an African Nova Scotian mentor/role model to 
help rehabilitate him.320
III. Keeping perspective: things to address going forward
This part should not detract from the commendable work that the judiciary 
(defence counsel, and at times the Crown) is doing in an attempt to address 
the overincarceration of Black Canadians and the systemic anti-Black 
racism that contributes to bring African Canadian people before the courts. 
Instead it should be viewed as a reminder that there are still lessons to be 
learned and work to be done. Four key recommendations are addressed 
in the part: (1) judges and the Crown should stop relying on “this is not 
315. Boutilier, supra note 1 at para 59; Downey, supra note 1 at para 34; Middleton, supra note 1 at 22, 
26; Anderson, supra note 1 at para 112. See also, R v X, supra note 1 at paras 253-264. Judge Derrick 
compared the services available to “X” in both a youth and adult facility. 
316. See e.g. OCI, A Case Study of Diversity in Corrections, supra note 27; Anderson, supra note 1 at 
paras 75-79; Owusu-Bempah & Wortley, supra note 8. 
317. OCI, A Case Study of Diversity in Corrections, supra note 27.
318. Ibid. 
319. Middleton, supra note 1 at 16-17. 
320. Anderson, supra note 1 at paras 102-103. 
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Gladue”-type arguments to exclude a systemic approach to sentencing 
for Black Canadians; (2) IRCAs should be mandatory unless waived by 
the offender; (3) IRCAs should supplement other interventions needed 
to address the overincarceration of Black Canadians; and, (4) judges 
should include some analysis of how the systemic information mitigates 
their sentence. Two additional points are addressed brie y to identify the 
need for more work. More thought must be given to,  rst, the type of 
information that should be included in an IRCA and who should write the 
IRCA, and second, the role of defence counsel and the need for training on 
how to make race-based arguments in sentencing. 
1. Moving beyond “This is not Gladue”
There is no question that the circumstances of Aboriginal Peoples are 
unique. However, nothing about the process or rationale for considering 
systemic and race-based factors in sentencing Black Canadians seeks to 
deny this reality. And yet, at times, the underlying arguments from the 
Crown and reasoning from the judiciary reads as though sentencing Black 
Canadians in a manner that takes our history into account somehow 
detracts from the remedial and unique approach to sentencing Aboriginal 
offenders.321 Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code does speci cally 
mention Aboriginal Peoples322; the government does have constitutionally 
enshrined obligations to Aboriginal Peoples; and Aboriginal Peoples do 
have a unique relationship to the rest of Canada. However, this does not 
mean that Black Canadians do not have a legitimate claim to have our 
unique history, and the present-day manifestations of this history, factor 
into how we are sentenced by the court. This is especially true since s 
718.2(e) refers to “all offenders.”323
This country was built on the backs of enslaved people of African 
descent.324 Many of our ancestors were forcibly removed from their 
homes and loaded onto ships destined for Canada to work the land that 
was forcefully stolen from Indigenous communities.325 The conditions 
321. See e.g. Jackson, supra note 1 at paras 93-96; Kabanga-Muanza, supra note 1 at para 63; 
Brissett, supra note 1 at para 66. 
322. Criminal Code, supra note 37 at s 718.2(e). 
323. Ibid.
324. See e.g. Barrington Walker, “Introduction: From a Property Right to Citizenship Rights—The 
African Canadian Legal Odyssey” in Barrington Walker, ed, The African Canadian Legal Odyssey 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012) 3 [Walker, “Introduction”]; Winks, supra note 87. 
325. Not all people of African descent arrived as enslaved people during this time period. In Nova 
Scotia, for example, there were four distinct period through which people of African descent arrived: 
Slavery, The Black Loyalists, The Jamaican Maroons and the Black Refugees. See e.g. Harvey 
Amani Whit eld, Blacks on the Border: The Black Refugee in British North America, 1815–1860, 
(Burlington, Vermont: University of Vermont Press, 2006) [Blacks on the Border]; Whit eld, North to 
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onboard these ships were horri c.326 Those who survived the journey 
were raped, tortured, and forced into manual labour.327 Others were 
murdered.328 Slavery was a form of biological discrimination that resulted 
in “pervasive and myriad social forms of anti-Black racism.”329 This anti-
Black racism became entrenched during the hundreds of years through 
which slavery thrived in Canada.330 It continues to be entrenched in our 
institutions, including the criminal justice system, to this day.331 The court 
should take this into account in sentencing where it has played a role in 
the circumstance of the offence or the offender. They are required to do 
this on the plain reading of ss 718.1 and 718.2(e), and the individualized 
nature of sentencing. 
2. The case for making IRCAs mandatory332
Justice Nakatsaru declined to declare IRCAs mandatory in Jackson. One 
of his reasons for doing so was that Gladue Reports themselves are not 
mandatory in sentencing Aboriginal offenders, even though s 718.2(e) 
speci cally mentions Aboriginal people. Instead, it is the information 
contained in a Gladue Report that is mandatory unless waived by the 
offender.333 While this is true, the argument is not that IRCAs in and of 
themselves should be mandatory, the argument is that the information 
contained in the IRCA should be mandatory, and the IRCA is a proven, 
effective way of getting this information before the court.334
Bondage, supra note 5; Walker, “Introduction,” supra note 324. However, due to racist immigration 
policies, until approximately 1950, the majority of Black Canadians lived in Nova Scotia and were 
descendants of the enslaved people brought to Canada during the trans-Atlantic slave trade. 
326. See e.g. Ken Donovan, “Female Slaves as Sexual Victims in Île Royale” (2014) 43:1 Acadiensis 
147 at 148.
327. See e.g. Winks, supra note 87 at 4-9; Donovan, “Slavery and Freedom,” supra note 87 at 111; 
Donovan, “Slaves and their Owners,” supra note 87 at 3. See also Whit eld, North to Bondage, supra 
note 5; Whit eld, Blacks on the Border, supra note 325 at 12-24; DG Bell, Barry Cahil & Harvey 
Amani Whit eld, “Slavery and Slave Law in the Maritimes” in Barrington Walker, ed, The African 
Canadian Legal Odyssey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012) 363 at 364.
328. See supra note 327.
329. Walker, “Introduction,” supra note 324 at 21. 
330. Ibid at 6. See also Esmeralda MA Thornhill in Consultative Conference, supra note 86 at 68; 
David Steeves, “Maniacal Murderer or Death Dealing Car: The Case of Daniel Perry Sampson, 1933–
1935” in Barrington Walker, ed, The African Canadian Legal Odyssey (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2012) at 201.
331. See supra notes 81-82.
332. Nothing in this section should be taken to suggest that judges are not able to mitigate for systemic 
racism without having an IRCA. 
333. See Jackson, supra note 1 at para 95. 
334. See e.g. Morris, supra note 1 at paras 27, 66; R v X, supra note 1 at para 258; R v Gabriel, supra 
note 1 at paras 90-91; Jackson, supra note 1 at paras 95, 103, 123. 
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Morris, Jackson, Biya, Brissett, Shallow, Ferguson, Clarke, Desmond, 
and Gaynor are all illustrative of this point.335 In Morris Justice Nakatsaru 
commented on the volume of information presented to him through both 
expert reports: “I will say in my many years as a judge, I have seldom 
come across so much information presented to me at a sentencing hearing 
in general let alone materials speci c to the issue of anti-Black racism 
and a Black offender.”336 In some cases decided after Jackson, judges 
have declined to consider race-based arguments where they have not been 
presented with evidence that connects the systemic issues to the particular 
circumstances of the offender. In Biya, Brissett, Shallow, Ferguson, 
Clarke, and Gaynor defence counsel attempted to raise arguments about 
overincarceration and the need to consider systemic factors, however they 
did not provide the court with the necessary evidence linking these factors 
to their respective clients.337 Making IRCAs (or the information contained 
in them) mandatory would ensure that this does not happen in the future. 
IRCAs should also be mandatory because they ensure that race-based 
issues are considered by the court. Justice Nakatsaru stated in Jackson 
that judges are able to decide whether they need more information about 
the circumstance of the offender and systemic issues in a given case.338
With respect, it should not be left to the judiciary to determine this point. 
Professor Tanovich explains how at times the judiciary has failed to adopt 
critical race standards and arguments, and at times was, or appeared to be, 
“hostile” when asked to adjudicate racial issues.339 There is also a historic 
reluctance to address race in court proceedings by all players. For example, 
the historical record shows that both the judiciary and the legislature were 
reluctant to declare slavery illegal until 1843 out of fear that doing so 
would impute a presumption of legality to slavery.340 The historical record 
also shows that lawyers have been either reluctant or oblivious to the racial 
issues at play in their cases.341 
335. All supra note 1. 
336. Morris, supra note 1 at para 27. This information was presented in the form of two reports: one 
detailing the historical context, and another addressing how this impacted Morris. An IRCA typically 
brings these two things together into one document. See e.g. R v X, supra note 1; Jackson, supra note 
1 at para 28. 
337. Biya, supra note 1 at para 36; Shallow, supra note 1 at paras 48, 51; Brissett, supra note 1 at para 
70; Ferguson, supra note 1 at paras 125-129.
338. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 100. 
339. Tanovich, “The Charter of Whiteness,” supra note 87 at 662-672.
340. See e.g. Barry Cahil, “Slavery and the Judges of Loyalist Nova Scotia,” supra note 87 at 76, 84-
86; Bell, Cahil & Whit eld, supra note 327 at 382.
341. See e.g. Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900–
1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 
1999) at 229 setting out the circumstances of Viola Desmond’s case. Her case is illustrative of the fact 
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Beyond ensuring that race-based arguments are considered by the 
court, IRCAs are also helpful to the judiciary.342 Justice Brothers would 
have liked an IRCA in Desmond, but she was not provided with one.343
Justice Campbell also explained in Gabriel that judges are not always able 
to understand the perspective of a Black offender: “[o]ur common sense and 
our understanding of human nature are products of our own background 
and experience. An individual judge’s common sense and understanding 
of human nature may offer little insight into the actions of a young African 
Nova Scotian male.”344 In a report commissioned by former Chief Justice 
of Nova Scotia, Michael MacDonald, Justice Oland also identi ed the 
need to diversify the bench to better understand the circumstances of 
the people who are before the court.345 Former Chief Justice of Canada, 
Beverly McLachlin has raised similar concerns.346 IRCAs therefore help 
bridge the experience gap between the judge and offender.
Further, making IRCAs mandatory limits the Crown’s ability to argue 
repeatedly that they are unnecessary or irrelevant to the case at bar, or that 
there is insuf cient evidence to take systemic factors into consideration.347
This is a signi cant reality. For example, Robert Wright’s quali cations 
were heavily contested in X.348 In Morris, the Crown argued that the race-
based information was not corroborated by outside sources; that the scope 
of the writer’s expertise and the “nature of the opinion” she was offering 
were unclear.349 In Anderson, the Crown argued that “society should not 
that race is often mediated and adjudicated without expressly being discussed. See e.g. DeLancy v 
Woodin, supra note 11; Gilpin v Halifax Alehouse Limited, 2013 CanLII 43798 (NS HRC).
342. See e.g. Borde, supra note 1 at paras 22-23, referring to a recommendation made by the 
Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System on the need for judicial 
education (Canada, Commission on Systemic Racism, supra note 86 at 285). 
343. Supra note 1 at para 28. 
344. Gabriel, supra note 1 at para 57. 
345. Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, No One Looks Like Me: Diversity on the Bench, 
Report by Justice Linda Lee Oland, Commissioned by Chief Justice Michael MacDonald, (Nova 
Scotia: 2016) [unpublished].
346. See The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C. Chief Justice of Canada, “Judging: 
the Challenges of Diversity” (Judicial Studies Committee Inaugural Annual Lecture, delivered in 
Edinburgh, Scotland, 7 June 2012), online (pdf): <http://www.scotland-judiciary.org.uk/Upload/
Documents/JSCInauguralLectureJune2012.pdf> [https://perma.cc/3KLZ-AH42]. 
347. See e.g. R v X, supra note 1; R v Jackson, supra note 1 at para 37; Elvira, supra note 1 at 
paras 21, 26; Morris, supra note 1 at paras 12, 20, 23; Williams, supra note 1 at para 26, where the 
Crown argued that the record “was scant” with respect to connecting the offender’s background to his 
offences.  
348. See e.g. R v X, supra note 1 at paras 163, 176-177. 
349. Morris, supra note 1 at para 23. However, the Crown seems to have abandoned this argument on 
appeal, as they seem to accept that the information is relevant and are instead challenging how Justice 
Nakatsaru applied it. See e.g. Teodora Pasca, “Substantive equality in sentencing: Interventions in R v 
Morris and R v Sharma,” online: <https://aspercentre.ca/tag/ontario-court-of-appeal/> [https://perma.
cc/6D75-BNZ5].
152 The Dalhousie Law Journal
be ‘held responsible or hostage’” for Anderson’s life circumstances.350
This argument is especially problematic given that Anderson’s life 
circumstances as a Black man are a product of the prevalent anti-Black 
racism in Canada and Nova Scotia in particular. In Jackson, although the 
report was admitted by consent, the Crown still argued that the systemic 
and background factors had “little relevance” to Jackson’s circumstances, 
and that the information in the report was “more pertinent” to how he 
would be dealt with in jail than to his sentence.351 
With respect, Crown prosecutors should have no standing to argue 
that centuries-long, pervasive, systemic anti-Black racism has no impact 
on the circumstances of an African Canadian person, particularly when the 
criminal justice system itself is deeply implicated in the overincarceration 
of African Canadians.352 Further, the SCC has held that the prosecutor’s 
role is not to win or lose, but rather their function is a “matter of public 
duty” that must be exercised fairly, and with the dignity, seriousness, and 
justness that judicial proceedings require.353 This is echoed in the Model 
Code of Professional Conduct, which requires prosecutors to “act for the 
public and the administration of justice resolutely and honourably…”354
In addition to these substantive reasons, IRCAs should also be 
mandatory because of their cost. IRCAs cost on estimate from $3,000– 
$9,000.355 As a result of the systemic barriers to education and employment, 
many of the individuals who could bene t from these reports are unable 
to afford them.356 Although some offenders are represented by Legal Aid, 
resources are limited and reports cannot be paid for in every case where 
they may be bene cial. If the reports are mandatory, then the onus shifts 
from the individual to the government to pay for them. 
3. Multiple interventions are needed to address overincarceration
Some critics have questioned the effectiveness of cultural approaches to 
sentencing in addressing overincarceration.357 This point is frequently 
350. Anderson, supra note 1 at para 35. 
351. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 37. 
352. See e.g. Dr Head & Clairmont, supra note 86 at 69 noting the “widespread discrimination against 
Blacks in the criminal justice system,” and that the justice system “has not met the needs of the 
residents of Nova Scotia for ‘equal justice under the law.’”
353. Boucher v R, [1955] SCR 16, 110 CCC 263 at 24. Although this case dealt with Crown conduct 
in the course of a trial, the same principles should also apply to sentencing hearings. Fairness remains 
a relevant consideration at sentencing. 
354. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct, amended 
14 March 2017, at 5.1-3.
355. This was the average cost in 2016. It is likely to have changed since then. 
356. This is largely a result of unequal access to education and employment, as discussed above. 
357. See e.g. Carmela Murdocca, To Right Historical Wrongs: Race, Gender, and Sentencing in 
Canada (Vancouver: UBS Press, 2013) at 171. Murdocca argues that s 718.2(e) has done little to 
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raised in reference to Gladue Reports, as they arguably have done little to 
address the overincarceration of Aboriginal Peoples.358 While this concern 
is valid, IRCAs and other cultural assessments are only one of many 
interventions needed to address the problem of overincarceration. They 
cannot be expected to remedy this systemic, social issue on their own. 
Professor H. Archibald Kaiser explains, “[b]ecause of the public, solemn 
and deliberate nature of judicial proceedings, there is some tendency to 
overstate the remedial potential of the sentencing proceedings.”359 He went 
on to quote the SCC in Gladue and the trial judge in Hamilton, both to the 
effect that although society expects the courts to remedy social issues, the 
criminal justice system should not be expected to remedy entrenched and 
“profoundly complex” social problems on its own.360 Similarly, Dr. Ivan 
Zinger, the Correctional Investigator, has suggested that we should “look 
upstream”361 to improve the “socioeconomic, cultural, and political rights 
of vulnerable segments of the Canadian population….”362 
Multiple interventions are necessary. Interventions are needed 
in society in general, as Dr. Zinger suggests, and at all levels of the 
criminal justice system. Overincarceration is not simply a result of racist 
sentencing practices. It is a direct result of centuries-long systemic racism 
that is pervasive in all aspects of Canadian society including, for example, 
policing, education, housing, employment, and health.363 It is also a direct 
result of the criminal justice system disproportionately targeting Black 
Canadians, from policing and surveillance, through bail, to conviction, 
address overincarceration, and also “reinscribes racism in criminal justice processes” (ibid).
358. See e.g. Kent Roach, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Gladue at Ten and in the Courts 
of Appeal” (2009) 54:4 Crim LQ 470; The Canadian Bar Association, “Fifteen years after Gladue, 
what progress?” The Canadian Bar Association (15 April 2014), online: <www.nationalmagazine.
ca> [https://perma.cc/N6Q9-QCLE]; Jonathan Rudin, “Aboriginal Overrepresentation and R. v. 
Gladue:  Where We Were, Where We Are and Where We Might Be Going” in Jamie Cameron & James 
Stribopoulos, eds, The Charter and Criminal Justice: TwentyFive Years Later, (Ontario: LexisNexis 
Canada, 2008) at 687, 700-704; Jonathan Rudin, “Addressing Aboriginal Overrepresentation 
PostGladue: A Realistic Assessment of How Social Change Occurs” (2009) 54:4 Crim LQ 447; David 
Milward & Debra Parkes, “Gladue: Beyond Myth and Towards Implementation in Manitoba” (2011) 
35:1 Man LJ 84; Brian R Pfefferle, “Gladue Sentencing: Uneasy Answers to the Hard Problem of 
Aboriginal Over-Incarceration” (2008) 32:2 Man LJ 113.
359. H Archibald Kaiser, “Borde and Hamilton: Facing the Uncomfortable Truth About Inequality, 
Discrimination and General Deterrence” (2003) 8:6 CR-ART 289 at 2.
360. Ibid quoting Gladue, supra note 44 at para 65, and R v Hamilton, [2003] OJ No 532, 172 CCC 
(3d) 114 (trial decision) at para 150.
361. Bascaramuty, supra note 2. 
362. Douglas Quan, “Consider impact of systemic racism before sentencing black offenders, Canadian 
judges urged,” The National Post (25 April 2017), online: <www.nationalpost.com> [https://perma.cc/
NTJ5-L6MH]. 
363. See e.g. Walker, African Canadian Legal Odyssey, supra note 87 at 21; Maynard, supra note 6 
at 11.
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sentencing, incarceration, parole and release conditions.364 Considering 
background and systemic factors in sentencing is a vital component of the 
holistic approach needed to fully address overincarceration.
4. Moving beyond “I have considered the systemic and background 
factors”
Judges are not wrong to state that they have considered the systemic 
and background factors in sentencing. Instead, this part suggests that 
they should provide some analysis of how the systemic and background 
factors inform their sentence. For example, in  rearm possession cases, 
courts will sometimes explain how possession on the “true crime” end 
of the spectrum is an aggravating factor, which will result in the accused 
receiving a harsher sentence.365 This may be dif cult to do for systemic 
factors, given that there is minimal case law on these issues. Further, 
certain systemic factors do not automatically bump an offence into a 
different sentencing range; instead they are part of the whole sentencing 
analysis and help inform the appropriate sentence.
There are two related concerns with “I have considered it”-type 
analyses. First, with respect, it is hard to know that the judiciary is 
mitigating the sentence in an appropriate way if there is no explanation 
other than “I have considered it.” The main concern here is that the process 
for sentencing Black Canadians is new, and in the years since Borde, 
Hamilton, X, and even Gabriel, it has changed. For example, in Gabriel, 
Justice Campbell reasoned that “it would be wrong to suggest that there 
should be a lowered standard of moral responsibility” as a result of a person’s 
racial background.366 However, more recently, judges have concluded that 
systemic and background information is relevant to moral culpability.367
For example, in Morris, Justice Nakatsaru found that systemic and case-
speci c factors lessened Morris’ moral blameworthiness.368 Similarly, 
in NW, Judge Buckle speci cally addresses this aspect of Gabriel, with 
reference to Ipeelee: 
[35] In my view, the Supreme Court is not suggesting that a person’s 
moral culpability is potentially diminished because of that person’s 
364. See e.g. Owusu-Bempah & Wortley, supra note 8 at 10; African Canadian Legal Clinic, Civil and 
Political Wrong, supra note 6; African Canadian Legal Clinic, Errors and Omissions, supra note 6; 
Canada, Commission on Systemic Racism, supra note 86; Tanovich, The Colour of Justice, supra note 
10. 
365. See e.g. Elvira, supra note 1 at para 12.
366. Supra note 1 at paras 52, 54, 89. 
367. See e.g. Jackson, supra note 1 at paras 61, 66, 75; Morris, supra note 1 at para 75; Elvira, supra 
note 1 at para 26.
368. Morris, supra note 1 at para 75.
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race or cultural background.  Rather, a person’s moral culpability is 
potentially diminished because of the “constrained circumstances” 
which they may have found themselves in because of the operation of 
systemic and background factors that are connected to their race and 
cultural background.369
Second, this area of the law is unsettled and developing. Although 
judges are not obligated to explain how they have considered every relevant 
factor in sentencing, it would be helpful for them do so with respect to race-
based arguments. This would create a growing body of case law that other 
judges could draw on for guidance in how to treat race-based arguments 
as mitigating factors. For example, Judge Sakalauskas raised some helpful 
questions in Robinson: (1) whether the defendant’s moral culpability is 
affected by race and cultural factors; (2) how these systemic and race-
based factors impacted the defendant’s offending and contributed to them 
being before the court; and (3) whether there are speci c sentencing 
options that should be applied because of (1) and (2).370 These questions 
provide a helpful starting point, but should not be seen as an exhaustive 
explanation of how to treat race-based arguments as mitigating factors. 
Judge Williams’ analysis in Anderson is also informative. She reviews Mr. 
Anderson’s needs and considers whether they could be better addressed in 
custody or in the community.371 
5. IRCAs: who should write them and what to include
IRCAs are only helpful if they are credible and informative. To this end, 
they must be written by quali ed people, and contain information that 
is helpful to the court. Boutilier is informative in this regard. Justice 
Chipman dictated who could write the report and what he wanted it to 
contain.372 He speci cally ordered that the author(s) have “specialized 
knowledge, education and experience in the completion of such reports 
relating to systemic and background factors affecting the African-Nova 
Scotian Community.”373 A review of the case law indicates that only 
nine people in Canada have written these reports374: Robert Wright,375
369. NW, supra note 1 at para 35. 
370. Supra note 1 at para 23. 
371. Anderson, supra note 1 at paras 75-79, 88-95, 104-107. 
372. Boutilier, supra note 1 at para 17. 
373. Ibid.
374. Mr. Wright is currently in the process of training other people to write IRCAs. 
375. See e.g. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 93; R v X, supra note 1 at para 178; Boutilier, supra note 1 
at para 29; Riley, supra note 1 at para 18; Middleton, supra note 1; Faulkner, supra note 1 at para 17, 
Anderson, supra note 1 at para 39. 
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Lana MacLean,376 Camisha Sibblis,377 Dr. Hansen,378 Professor Owusu-
Bempah,379 Professor James,380 Natalie Hodgson,381 Sonya Paris,382
and Professor Marta-Marika Urbanik.383 This does not mean that these 
professionals are the only people capable of writing an IRCA. However, 
it does mean that the Canadian government should expend the funds 
necessary to train more writers. They have an obligation to do so in light 
of the overrepresentation of Black Canadians in prison. Regardless of 
whether IRCAs become mandatory, nine people is certainly too few to 
meet the potential demand across the country. If and when the government 
does decide to train more writers, they should do so in consultation with 
Mr. Wright, Ms. MacLean, Ms. Sibblis, Dr. Hansen, Professor Owusu-
Bempah, Professor James, Ms. Hodgson, Ms. Paris and Professor Urbanik. 
The objective of an IRCA is to examine the role that systemic factors 
have played in the offences before the court. It must therefore address 
systemic anti-Black racism and how it manifests in Canadian society and 
connect these factors to the particular circumstances of the offender and 
their offences. An IRCA should therefore include information relating to, 
but not limited by, the following factors: the history of Black Canadians in 
the region where the offender has lived, barriers to employment, education, 
including the school-to-prison pipeline, community fragmentation, 
intergenerational trauma, the overrepresentation of African Canadians 
in the criminal justice system, and mental health. The author should be 
careful to connect the broader systemic factors to the lived experiences of 
the offender and then explain how this contributes to the offences.384 For 
example, the education system in this country systemically underserves 
Black Canadians.385 In Nimaga, the evidence showed how this led to 
376. See e.g. Perry, supra note 1 at para 7; Gabriel, supra note 1 at para 43; Downey, supra note 1 at 
para 6, Robinson, supra note 1 at para 5. 
377. Morris, supra note 1 at para 14. 
378. Dr. Hansen prepared the s 34 assessment in NW, supra note 1 at para 28, which included a “race 
and culture component.” 
379. Professor Owusu-Bempah wrote the IRCA in TJT, supra note 1 at para 42 and co-authored the 
reports in Morris, supra note 1 at para 18.
380. Professor James co-authored the report in Morris, supra note 1 at para 18. 
381. In Anderson, supra note 1 at para 39, Ms. Natalie Hodgson co-authored the IRCA with Mr. 
Wright. She is an African Nova Scotian School Counsellor and earned her second Master of Education 
in Counselling as part of an Afrocentric cohort, aimed at addressing the needs of African Nova Scotian 
learners. 
382. In Robinson, supra note 1 at para 5, Ms. Sonya Paris co-authored the IRCA with Ms. McLean.
383. See Husbands, supra note 1 at para 80. 
384. Judge Williams provides a detailed account of the information presented in the IRCA in 
Anderson, supra note 1. This may be a helpful starting point for those looking to understand what kind 
of information and detail should go into IRCAs. 
385. See e.g. Black Learners Advisory Committee, supra note 86; Morris, supra note 1 at para 74; 
Carl James, Towards Race Equity in Education, supra note 9. See also Anderson, supra note 1 at paras 
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Nimaga not receiving proper interventions for his learning disabilities, 
which led to him getting in trouble at school, dropping out of school, and 
becoming addicted to drugs and involved in the criminal justice system.386
6. The role of defence counsel and the need for training in race-based 
arguments
Finally, it goes without saying that defence counsel play a key role in 
their clients’ interaction with the criminal justice system; defence counsel 
are the people who must ensure that their clients’ interests are before the 
court. As such, they play a pivotal role in helping to ensure that the court 
takes systemic and background factors into account in sentencing their 
clients. As indicated in some of the cases above, courts are reluctant to 
treat systemic anti-Black racism as a mitigating factor where they do not 
have evidence regarding the effects of that racism on the person before the 
court.387 Defence counsel therefore need to know that they must present 
this information to the court. They also need to know that they must make 
arguments about how it should mitigate sentence. This should not be left 
to the IRCA’s author, nor should the evidence be left to speak for itself.388
The task of sentencing cannot be delegated.389 While defence counsel can 
and should use social workers or other professionals to get systemic and 
background evidence before the court, it is ultimately their responsibility 
to make sentencing submissions on their client’s behalf. Then it is up to the 
judge to apply the law and arrive and a just sentence. 
One way to ensure that defence lawyers are aware of their ability and 
responsibility to raise race-based arguments is through proper training. 
Various law schools and Barristers’ societies require law students and 
lawyers to take some form of legal ethics and cultural competency training. 
These institutions should incorporate mandatory training on how to raise 
race-based arguments. This work should be done in consultation with the 
lawyers, academics, and other professionals who are on the frontlines. 
It would also be helpful to provide this training to the community pro 
52-54.
386. Nimaga, supra note 1 at paras 52, 60. In Robinson, supra note 1 at para 24, Judge Sakalauskas 
concluded that neither the Gladue report nor the IRCA provided enough information about the 
accused’s offending to support either report’s recommended sentence. Despite containing information 
about Robinson’s lived experience, worldview, and life context, the reports did not connect this to, or 
provide information about, her offending behaviour. 
387. See supra note 247.
388. For example, in Cromwell, supra note 1 at para 51, Justice Jamieson states that she “was given 
very little by way of submissions” on how to take Cromwell’s cultural background into account. 
Although this case did not involve an IRCA, the caution about defence counsel needing to make 
submissions on how systemic information mitigates sentence is relevant. 
389. Jackson, supra note 1 at para 104. 
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bono to ensure there is a broad awareness of the ability to make race-
based arguments at sentencing. These measures will help to ensure that the 
criminal justice system operates more fairly. 
Conclusion
Canada has a very real and pressing problem when it comes to the 
overincarceration of African Canadians. This issue has been repeatedly 
identi ed in the literature, by the government, the judiciary, and by 
international organizations.390 Yet, little has been done to address the 
issue; African Canadians continue to be overrepresented in custody and 
continue to experience harsher conditions while in custody.391 Perhaps this 
is because judges “seemingly [take race into account] with a degree of 
caution that may not account fully for the reality of racial injustice that is 
so conspicuous in Canada as to be undeniable.”392
The time has come to take meaningful action to address this issue. 
Although the causes of overincarceration are complex and therefore a 
holistic, multi-faceted approach is needed, how judges approach sentencing 
African Canadian people plays an important role. Section 718.2(e) of the 
Criminal Code authorizes judges to include the remediation of systemic 
anti-Black racism in a proper sentencing analysis for African Canadians. 
This enables the court to treat systemic anti-Black racism, and the effect 
of this racism on the offender, as mitigating factors in sentencing. To do 
otherwise is to exclude African Canadians from a remedial protection 
intended to apply to “all offenders,” perpetuating the systemic racism that 
pervades our history and continues today. 
390. See e.g. supra notes 1, 86-87. 
391. See e.g. supra notes 14-16, 19, 27. 
392. AL, supra note 1 at para 86.
